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Comments
TAXATION-DECISIONS BY THE MISSOURI SUPREME COURT DURING THE YEAR 1939.*
I. Taxation of income derived from transactions partly within and partly without
this state
Artophone Corporation v. Coale, was a suit to abate income taxes assessed
against the company for the year 1936. The circuit court refused to abate part of
*This comment should be read with the symposium on The Work of the
Missouri Supreme Court for the Year 199 (1940) 5 Mo. L. REv. 377.
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the tax assessed, and the company appealed to the supreme court. The agreed
statement of facts, upon which the case was submitted, disclosed that the com-
pany's only places of business were its principal office, warehouse and service
department in St. Louis, and a branch office, warehouse and service department
in Kansas City. The company was engaged in the business of distributing elec-
trical appliances, such as washing machines, radios, and refrigerators, in a
territory comprising parts of Missouri, Kansas, Illinois and Kentucky. A staff of
traveling salesmen was maintained at the head office, and they procured orders
throughout that territory. However, all such orders were taken subject to the
approval of the head office in St. Louis. The goods were shipped by rail or by
trucks, owned by others but under contract with the company, to purchasers out-
side Missouri from its warehouses in Missouri, or were shipped direct from the
manufacturers, all of which were located in states other than Missouri, to the
out-of-state purchasers.
The question involved in this case was the manner in which the sales to out-
of-state purchasers should be treated in computing the company's income tax
liability for the year 1936. The company claimed that the income derived from
those sales resulted from transactions partly within and partly without Missouri
and, therefore, should be allocated. On the other hand, the state auditor and the
assessor contended that all of the income so derived was taxable by Missouri.2
The statute provided for the taxation of all corporations, both foreign and
domestic, only on income derived from sources in this state.3 Where income
results from a transaction partially in this state and partially in another state
or states, and that part of the income attributable to transactions in this state
cannot be segregated, the statute sets out a formula which the taxpayer may
elect to use in computing its net income.
In holding that the company might elect to compute its income in accordance
with that formula, the court relied heavily on the historical background of that
particular section of the income tax statute. The first income tax law, enacted
in 1917, imposed a tax on the net income of domestic corporations from all sources,
but taxed the net income of foreign corporations only when it was derived from
sources in this state.4 In 1927 the law was changed to tax both domestic and
foreign corporations on the same basis, that is, on income received from sources
within this state.5 The formula for allocating income from transactions partly
2. Id. at 345. Prior to 1933 the state auditor interpreted the act to permit
allocation under facts similar to those here presented. However, in that year
a different person became state auditor, and he interpreted the act contrary to
his predecessor. The problem of the weight to be given administrative rulings
and regulations and changes therein is not considered by the court. Evidently
it thought the statute so clear that administrative interpretation would be un-
necessary. In such a situation it is well settled that an administrative interpreta-
tion changing the clear meaning of a statute will have no validity. See, for
example, Campbell v. Galeno Chemical Co., 281 U. S. 599 (1930), and Interna-
tional Railway v. Davidson, 257 U. S. 506 (1922).
3. Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § 10115.
4. Mo. Laws 1917, p. 524.
5. Mo. Laws 1927, p. 475.
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within and without the state first became a part of the law in 1929.0 The court
thought this statutory history showed an intent on the part of the legislature
to eliminate discrimination between domestic and foreign corporations and to
tax income derived from corporate activities covering several states on a propor-
tionate basis.
Although the contract of sale was formed in Missouri, due to the necessity of
approval by the head office in St. Louis, the court felt that the term "transaction"
should be given a broad interpretation and should not be considered synonymous
with "contract." It then went on to hold that the several activities of the com-
pany and its agents properly fell within the concept of "transactions," since that
word "may comprehend a series of many occurrences." 7 The interstate or several-
state character of these activities brought them within the statutory requirement
of transactions partly within and partly without this state.
In its opinion, the court notices the familiar, but frequently neglected, rule
that taxing statutes are to be strictly construed in favor of the taxpayer.8
II. Inheritance tax on personal property received by widow under deceased hus-
band's will
In In re Bernays Estate v. Major,9 the testator left all his property, with the
exception of a nominal specific bequest, to his widow and the St. Louis Union
Trust Company, as trustees, in trust to pay the income to his widow for her life
and then to his daughter for her life, with remainder to his daughter's issue,
and in default of such issue to distribute the corpus in accordance with the Mis-
souri statute of descent and distribution obtaining at his daughter's death. One
section of the will stated that "the provisions herein made for my wife, shall
be in lieu of her dower, homestead, allowances, rights of election and all other
rights in my estate."10 The widow renounced her statutory rights and elected
to take under the will. An appraisal of the estate, which consisted entirely of
personal property, placed its net value at $133,321.05, which, on the basis of
mortality tables, was distributed $83,032.32 to the widow, $23,431.16 to the
daughter and $26,857.57 to corpus. In computing the tax on the widow's share,
the appraiser allowed her an exemption of only $20,000.00, and in computing the
tax on corpus he applied the higher rate established by statute for collateral
relations rather than the lower one set for lineal descendants. Exceptions filed
by the executors to these two items in the appraiser's report were overruled by
the probate and circuit courts, and this appeal followed.
6. Mo. Laws 1929, p. 423.
7. The court was quoting from Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange, 270
U. S. 593 (1926).
8. In support of this rule of construction, the court cites State ex rel. Ford
Motor Co. v. Gehner, 325 Mo. 24, 27 S. W. (2d) 1 (1930). That this rule is used
more as a justification for a result than a technique of construction can be seen
from the court's citation of and quotation from Cummins v. Kansas City Pub. Serv.
Co., 334 Mo. 672, 66 S. W. (2d) 920 (1933), to the effect that the fundamental
rule of statutory construction is ascertainment of the lawmaker's intent.
9. 344 Mo. 135, 126 S. W. (2d) 209 (1939).
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Appellants claim that in addition to the $20,000.00 exemption, the widow
should be allowed, free from tax, a deduction for her statutory "child's share""
which, when added to the $20,000.00 exemption, would equal more than the ap-
praised value of her share, with the result that no tax should be assessed against
her. On the other hand, respondent contends that the widow took her interest
in the estate by will, bringing her directly within the provisions of the inheritance
tax law. The supreme court affirmed the lower court's decision approving the
appraiser's report.
An understanding of the decision in this case requires an analysis of the
theories of succession both by will and intestacy, as well as a consideration of the
incidence of inheritance taxation.
The inheritance tax statute imposes a tax on the transfer of any property
"when the transfer is by will or by the intestate laws of this state."'12 Despite
the rather clear indication to the contrary in the statute, the court says the
tax is imposed on the right to receive rather than on the right to transfer property
after death.13 The justification for this view, or at least the reason behind it,
is the determination of exemptions and rates of tax on the basis of the status
of the person receiving the property rather than the amount of the net estate. 4
Where a husband dies intestate, his wife, at common law, held a dower right
in his real property. This right was said to have been inchoate during the
husband's life, attaching after coverture and seisin. Thus, when the husband
dies, the pre-existing right of dower was thought to ripen into an estate in the
realty. This alteration or change in the wife's rights on the husband's death was
held by many courts not to be a "transfer" within the meaning of inheritance
tax statutes. 5 When the wife relinquished dower and took under the will in lieu
thereof, it has been argued in several cases, and was argued by appellants in this
case, that she gave a valuable consideration for the property and was, therefore,
a purchaser rather than a transferee within the statute.
Although the wife had no common law rights in her husband's personal
property, statutes have ordinarily accorded her a right therein on her husband's
death. 6 However, this right can hardly be thought to come into existence until
death, and even at that time it is a limited one, being subject to the payment of
her husband's debts. In an earlier decision'7 the Supreme Court of Missouri
11. Mo. Rav. STAT. (1929) § 323, gives the surviving spouse an absolute
share in the deceased spouse's personalty "equal to the share of a child of such
deceased husband or wife."
12. Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § 570.
13. 344 Mo. at 140, 126 S. W. (2d) at 212. The Federal Estate Tax is im-
posed on the transfer of the net estate, (see 26 U. S. C. § 810 (Supp. 1934)); also,
Edwards v. Slocum, 264 U. S. 61 (1924), and is measured by the value of the net
estate.
14. Mo. REV. STAT. (1929) § 572.
15. For example, see McDonald v. Byrkett, 120 Ark. 295, 179 S. W. 491(1915); In re Strahan v. Wayne County, 93 Neb. 828, 142 N. W. 678 (1913);
and In re Weiler's Estate, 122 N. Y. Supp. 608 (Sur. Ct. 1910), aff'd, 139 App.
Div. 905, 124 N. Y. Supp. 1133 (1910).
16. See note 11, supra.
17. In re Rogers' Estate, 250 S. W. 576 (Mo. 1923).
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held that a widow who renounced the provisions of the will took her statutory
"child's share" in the personalty entirely free from inheritance taxes. Without
overruling that case, the majority of the court in the instant decision holds that a
widow who fails to renounce but takes under the will is taxable under the express
provisions of the statute.
Commissioner Westhues, in a minority opinion, concurred in by Judge Leedy
and Commissioner Bohling,' 8 approves the result but says the earlier decision
should be overruled. If taxability is to be determined solely on the fact of rejection
of the will, he believes the statute would be unconstitutional because of an un-
reasonable discrimination.
With respect to the question of the rate applicable in taxing the corpus, the
court says it should be the higher one applied to collateral relations, since a dis-
tribution to lineal descendants is contingent on the daughter having issue at her
death. In the event the corpus is in fact distributed to lineal descendants, the
statute provides for a rebate of the excess tax to them.19
III. Exemptions from real property tax
During the year 1939 the Missouri Supreme Court decided three cases, each
of which involved the question of exemptions from real property taxes.
In National Cemetery Association v. Benson,20 the association, which had been
incorporated pursuant to the laws relating to manufacturing and business corpora-
tions, sought an injunction to restrain sale of its lands because of delinquent
taxes. In 1911 it had purchased approximately 194 acres of land in St. Louis
County, a part of which was later subdivided into burial lots. However, sixty-
five acres of that tract were never platted for burial purposes and were subject
to disposition or use by the association for other purposes. The court held that
sixty-five acres taxable. Before land might be exempted under the constitutional
provision exempting cemeteries, 21 the court said it must in some effective manner
be "set apart" for the burial of the dead. Inherent in the very definition of the
word "cemetery" is the idea that land must be used or at least effectively dedicated
for burial purposes. That had not been done in this case. On a motion for re-
hearing, the court observed that the constitutional exemption covered cemeteries
operated by private enterprise for profit, as well as cemeteries operated by
religious and benevolent corporations, although the court adhered to its view
that the land involved in the instant case was not exempt, since it could not proper-
ly be called a cemetery.
18. The result of the majority opinion which was written by Commissioner
Cooley was concurred in by Commissioners Westhues and Bohling. That opinion
was adopted as the opinion of the court, with Tipton, C. J., and Ellison, J., con-
curring.
19. Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § 597.
20. 344 Mo. 784, 129 S. W. (2d) 842 (1939).
21. MO. CONST. art. X, § 6. Since this provision says certain property shall




Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1941
In Young Women's Christian Association v. Baumann,22 the association
sought an injunction against the collection of property taxes levied on certain
real estate owned by it in St. Louis. The constitution provides that certain
property may be exempted from taxation when it is "used exclusively for religious
worship, for schools, or for purposes purely charitable.123 A statutory provision
says such property shall be exempted. 24 The property in question, which was a
building in St. Louis, was used by the association in its program of assisting
and aiding young girls on spiritual, physical and economic problems. Thus,
an employment bureau, swimming pool and gymnasium were maintained in the
building, and various religious, social and educational programs were conducted
in it. A few bedrooms in the building were rented for a small charge to women
transients. In 1932 a cafeteria was operated by the association, but it was dis-
continued early in 1933. However, the association continued to serve luncheon
to its members and their guests for which a charge sufficient to cover cost only
was made.
The court held the property exempt since it was used exclusively for
religious, educational and charitable purposes. The use of part of the building
for a cafeteria in 1932 was held incidental to the primary use for charitable
purposes, and thus not destructive of the exclusiveness of that use. Three
earlier decisions by the court,2 5 refusing to exempt property owned by the Young
Men's Christian Association, were distinguished on the ground that in those cases
part of the property had been either leased to others for commercial purposes or
used by the association itself for various forms of commercial enterprise.
Laret Investment Co. v. Dickmann,26 was a suit to enjoin the Mayor of St.
Louis and others from executing an agreement between St. Louis and the Housing
Authority of St. Louis. Plaintiff alleged that the agreement attempted to
exempt the property of the Housing Authority from taxation, contrary to con-
stitutional and statutory provisions. The act under which the Housing Authority
was created2 7 did not say its property should be exempt from taxation. However,
it did say the Authority should be a municipal corporation, and the constitution
itself exempts from taxation property of municipal corporations. 28  The court
held that the Housing Authority was a municipal corporation, since it was a
body created by law and devoted to the performance of an essential public
function.2 9 Therefore, under the express and self-executing provision of her
constitution, its property was exempt from taxation.
22. 344 Mo. 898, 130 S. W. (2d) 499 (1939).
23. Mo. CONST. art. X, § 6. Since this exemption is permissive in terms,
it is not self-executing.
24. Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § 9743.
25. State ex rel. Koeln v. St. Louis Y. M. C. A., 259 Mo. 233, 168 S. W. 589
(1914); State ex rel. St. Louis Y. M. C. A. v. Gehner, 320 Mo. 1172, 11 S. W. (2d)
30 (1928); St. Louis Y. M. C. A. v. Gehner, 329 Mo. 1007, 47 S. W. (2d) 776
(1932).
26. 134 S. W. (2d) 65 (Mo. 1939).
27. 8 Mo. STAT. ANN. (1940) § 14813.1, see particularly § 14813.4.
28. MO. CONST. art. X, § 6.
29. This rather broad definition of "municipal corporation" has been con-
COMMENTS1941]
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Several other cases dealing to some extent with taxation problems were
decided by the court in 1939. Since no new or unusual problems were presented
in them, they will be accorded a more summary treatment.
In Vincent Realty Co. v. Brown,30 plaintiff, a corporation, sought a declaratory
judgment on the theory that a cloud was cast upon title to its property by the
section3 ' of the Missouri statutes which provides that taxes due from a corpora-
tion are a lien against its assets; that payment of such taxes is a condition
precedent to the right to transfer the whole or a major portion of its assets; and
that any such transfer without first paying accrued taxes is void. It was con-
tended that the section in question violates certain provisions of State and Federal
Constitutions. Demurrers to the petition were overruled and judgment for the
plaintiff on the pleadings was entered. In reversing and remanding the case,
the supreme court held that no cause of action was stated under the Declaratory
Judgment Act. The court's conclusion was based upon the reasoning that the lien
declared by the statute does not attach until the corporation makes a transfer of
the whole or major part of its assets. Since plaintiff had not transferred the
whole or major part of its assets, it had no "present interest" in the determination
of the question of the validity of the section.
The court gave no specific consideration to the fact that the statute in question
appears to impose a lien for all taxes or fees due and provides against loss of the
lien upon transfer by the corporation.
The case having gone off on the procedural point leaves the question of the
validity of the statute entirely unsettled.
Hull v. Bauman32 upholds the validity of recently enacted statutes33 providing
for the collection of delinquent tax bills in St. Louis. It had been contended
that the statutes were unconstitutional.34
sistently applied by the Missouri Supreme Court. See State ex rel. Caldwell v.
Little River Drainage District, 291 Mo. 72, 236 S. W. 15 (1921), and Grand River
Drainage District v. Reid, 341 Mo. 1246, 111 S. W. (2d) 151 (1937).
30. 344 Mo. 438, 126 S. W. (2d) 1162 (1939).
31. 3 Mo. STAT. ANN. (1940) § 4598a. The material part of that section
reads:
"All taxes . . . due . . . the State . . . or any
political subdivision thereof, by any . . . corporation,
. . . are hereby declared to constitute a . . . lien .
against the assets of such corporation . . .. and said lien
shall not be lost on said assets by any transfer thereof. The
payment of all taxes which are due . . . by any corporation,
. . . is hereby declared to be a condition precedent to the
right of said corporation . . . to sell, give away, assign or
transfer the whole or the major portion of its assets . . .
and any such sale, gift, assignment or transfer . . . without
all taxes . . . having been paid . . . prior to the sale,
gift, assignment or transfer of such assets, is hereby declared
to be null and void."
32. 131 S. W. (2d) 721 (Mo. 1939).
33. 12 Mo. STAT. ANN. (1940) §§ 9952A-2 to 9952A-18.
34. Among these were objections based on alleged violations of the con-
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In Duffley v. McCaskey,35 plaintiff had been endowed with a life interest in
certain lands of which defendant was remainderman. Suit had been brought by
the state against both life tenant and remainderman to foreclose a tax lien, and
the remainderman bought the land at the foreclosure sale. In this suit plaintiff
claimed that this purchase did not operate as a conveyance of her life interest but
merely as a payment of taxes and sought to have her title quieted against the re-
mainderman's claim. The court held that the purchase by the remainderman
operated as a conveyance of the life interest. Since, as between life tenant and
remainderman, the former is liable for taxes,38 there is no reason why the remain-
derman should not have all the rights of an ordinary purchaser at a tax sale.
J. W. MCAFEEST
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-STATB GRoss RECEIPTS TAX AFFECTING INTERSTATE
COMMERCE
The City of New York imposed a tax upon purchasers for consumption of
tangible property. The tax was fixed at two per cent of the amount of receipts
from all sales in the city. "Sale" was defined as "any transfer of title or possession,
or both . . . in any manner or by any means whatsoever for a consideration,
or any agreement therefor."' The tax provision specified that the tax should
be paid by the purchaser to the vendor, and in turn, the vendor was made liable
as an insurer for its payment to the city. Purchasers for resale were exempt,
and the purchaser who paid the tax and later resold was entitled to a refund.
A Pennsylvania corporation, engaged in mining coal in that state, maintained
sales offices in New York, where it entered into contracts of sale. To fill these
contracts, coal was mined in Pennsylvania, transported by train to a New Jersey
pier, and from there carried by seller's barges to the purchaser's plant or steam-
ship in New York where delivery was made. The purchaser did the unloading.
The United States Supreme Court held the tax was constitutional as applied to
sales made in New York by the Pennsylvania corporation.2
The subject of a gross receipts tax affecting interstate commerce has, from
its inception, been a very complex one. Such complexity is attributable in part
to the inevitable conflict between an unrelenting worship of a doctrinal phraseology
and a realization that the full developments of such a doctrine must be strictly
modified in the interests of state taxation.
35. 134 S. W. (2d) 62 (Mo. 1939).
36. This is the general rule. See citations in (1940) 126 A. L. R. 853, 863.
37. Attorney, St. Louis. LL.B., University of Missouri, 1926. Former Judge-
of the St. Louis Circuit Court.
1. N. Y. Laws Ex. Sess. 1933, c. 815, § 1(e).
2. MeGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co. 309 U. S. 33) (1940).
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Article I, Section 8, of the Federal Constitution specifies that "Congress shall
have power . . . to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among.
the several states. .
Chief Justice Marshall, in his famous decision in Brown v. Maryland,
suggested a broad and exclusive construction of this grant of federal power when
he asked:
"If the States may tax all persons and property found on their terri-
tory, what shall restrain them from taxing goods in their transit through
the State from one port to another, for the purpose of regxportation?"'
Marshall spoke of the Imports and Exports clause of the Federal Constitu-
tion, but his statements, as dicta, were intended to embrace commerce between
the states as well. 5
The less famous dissenting opinion of Justice Thompson, in Brown v. Mary-
land, advanced the normal reply to Marshall's fear of a future burden on com-
merce-that as a practical matter the contested law required no more of the
importer than was required of any other dealer in the article imported.0 Justice
Marshall had feared that a tax affecting sale would be certain to affect the Con-
stitutionally protected act of importation and thus endanger foreign commerce.
The dissent asserted that such a reason was untenable, pointing out that any tax,
as, for example, the clearly valid retail sales tax on the broken package, would
affect the act of importation. Thus nothing short of total exemption from state
charges, in any form at any time, would answer the supposed object of the Con-
stitution, and such an exemption is clearly not warranted by the Constitution. 7
The dissent's third criticism was that the power of the state to tax was sovereign
and the attempt of the national government to abridge such a power was an
unauthorized assumption of power.8 While the dissent may have overestimated the
scope of state power in this respect, the contention was noteworthy in that it
realized that some respect must be given to the necessity for state taxation in
instances where the commerce clause overlaps the state taxing power.9
Justice Marshall's characteristic attempt to extend his doctrine beyond the
facts of the case was frustrated in Woodruff v. Parham,o where Justice Miller
confined the "original package" doctrine of Brown v. Maryland to imports from
foreign nations. The reason of Marshall's doctrine, fear of the possibility of
burdening commerce, still persisted, however, in later decisions." It is clear, then,
that at an early date there existed two definite philosophies as to the degree of
protection to be afforded interstate commerce, and further, these philosophies
3. 12 Wheat. 419 (U. S. 1827).
4. Id. at 449.
5. "It may be proper to add that we suppose the principles laid down in
this case to apply equally to importations from a sister State." Id. at 449.
6. Id. at 450.
7. Id. at 455.
8. Id. at 456.
9. Note the necessity which Justice Stone finds for reconciling the necessity
of protecting interstate commerce with the purpose of the state taxing power in
the Berwind-White case, 309 U. S. 33, 49 (1940).
10. 8 Wall. 123 (U. S. 1868).
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diverged on the single issue of whether interstate commerce was to be held to be
impervious to the possibility of future state burdens, or whether the actuality,
the necessity of state taxation, was to form an element in the solution of aiy
problem involving the interstate commerce clause.'2
The first statute involving a gross receipts tax came before the Court in 1872.13
Two principle reasons were advanced for the decision upholding a tax levied on a
percentage of a corporation's gross receipts. First, the Court observed that the
tax was collected every six months and by that time the receipts would have been
separated from the interstate source and mingled with the property mass of the
taxpayer. 14 Secondly, the Court construed the levy to be an excise tax upon the
franchise of a state corporation, and the gross receipts to be the appropriate
measure of such a tax.
Two more cases involving the gross receipts tax faced the Court in 1887. In
Fargo v. Michigan,15 the Court distinguished the State Tax on Railway Gross
Receipts case, for in the Fargo case the corporation sought to be taxed by
Michigan was a Pennsylvania corporation, and for that reason the corporate
income could never be mingled with the corporation's Michigan property, and the
corporation had no Michigan franchise upon which an excise could be levied.16
In invalidating an attempted state tax upon a steamship company's gross receipts
in Philadelphia & Southern Steamship Co. v. Pennsylvania,7 Justice Bradley
asserted that the first ground of the State Tax on Railway Gross Receipts case was
untenable as "no matter when the tax is exacted . . it is an exaction aimed
at the commerce itself, and is a burden upon it, and seriously affects it."'' The
12. The latter impulse, apparent in Thompson, J.'s, dissent in Brown v.
Maryland, is even clearer in the opinion of Bradley, J., in Brown v. Houston, 114
U. S. 622, 633 (1885), where, in sustaining the application of a Louisiana tax
on coal of out-of-state origin which had come to rest in Louisiana, some of which
was later exported, he said: "Take the City of New York, for example. When the
assessor of taxes goes his round, must he omit from his list of taxables all goods
which have come into the city from the factories of New England and New
Jersey, or from the pastures and grainfields of the West? If he must, what will
be left for taxation? And how is he to distinguish between those goods which are
taxable and those which are not?"
Note (1939) 4 Mo. L. REV. 64, suggests that a basis for the reluctance of later
cases to sustain state gross receipts taxes may be based on Justice Marshall's as-
sertion in McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 431 (U. S. 1819), that "the power
to tax involves the power to destroy," and the notewriter points out that the
fallacy of such a fear lies in its inability to recognize distinctions of degree, as
Justice Holmes realized in his dissent in Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 277 U. S.
218, 223 (1928).
13. State Tax on Railway Gross Receipts, 15 Wall. 284 (U. S. 1872).
14. Note (1940) 40 COL. L. Rxv. 653, 654, n. 4, suggests that this was an
attempt to use the rule of Brown v. Maryland in the gross receipts situation. The
note disproves this approach, pointing out that even if we assume that the receipts
had become a fund in the possession of the railroad, the fact remains that the
tax was levied upon them with respect to their source as receipts from transac-
tions in interstate commerce, not as money in the possession of the company.
15. 121 U. S. 230 (1887).
16. Id. at 243.
17. 122 U. S. 326 (1887).
18. Id. at 342.
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second reason advanced in the early case was held inapplicable to the facts of the
case,19 though Justice Bradley's dictum approved it.20
The chief importance of the Philadelphia & Southern Steamship Co. case,
however, lies in its realization that a tax on the receipts from an enterprise has
the same effect as a tax on the enterprise itself.21 This realization was essential
to a construction of the commerce clause to give it the full effect the Court has
allowed, for taxation of the receipts was the logical means of state levy. When
the Court took this step, it had completed the background for its doctrinal ap-
proach to the determination of the validity of state taxes upon the gross receipts
of an enterprise engaged in interstate commerce, and it remained only for the
courts to reach further and further in their disregard of the important con-
sideration that "interstate commerce must pay its way' 2 2 in their anxiety to
protect interstate commerce from an anticipated but non-existent burden, multiple
taxation. Subsequent cases illustrate such an extension.23
It was apparent, however, in the earliest cases that the mere label "Gross
Receipts" was not sufficient to require invalidation of a given tax. Since the
rationale of invalidity in the gross receipts cases necessitated a regulation of in-
terstate commerce 24 or a burden thereon, either actual 25 or possible,20 many taxes
using gross receipts as a measure, as well as many taxes imposed on articles of
interstate commerce, have been held valid. Thus, a tax imposed "in lieu" of a
property tax and using gross receipts as its measure has been sustained. 27 The
tax, as a property tax, must be reasonable, however, and if it exceeds the
amount which could properly be levied under the property tax law, the tax is
void as a regulation of commerce. 28 Similarly a tax may be levied on net income
which is wholly derived from interstate commerce. 29
19. Ibid. "It certainly could not have been intended as a tax on the corporate
franchise, because, by the terms of the act, it was laid equally on the corporations
of other states doing business in Pennsylvania."
20. Id. at 345: "The corporate franchises, the property, the business, the
income of corporations created by a state may undoubtedly be taxed by the state.
21. Id. at 336. An excellent discussion of the earlier cases is found in Note
(1940) 40 COL. L. Ray. 653.
22. Holmes, C. J., dissenting in New Jersey Bell Tel. Co. v. Tax Board, 280
U. S. 338, 351 (1930).
23. See note 30, infra.
24. Philadelphia & Southern S. S. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U. S. 326 (1887).
25. Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. v. Texas, 210 U. S. 217 (1908). Cf. New Jersey
Bell Tel. Co. v. Tax Board, 280 U. S. 338 (1930), where the tax paid for the use
of highways to string wires on telephone poles amounted to $3200 per mile.
26. Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., 120 U. S. 489 (1887).
27. United States Express Co. v. Minnesota, 223 U. S. 335 (1912); Cudahy
Packing Co. v. Minnesota, 246 U. S. 450 (1918). The "in lieu" tax furnishes a
practical plan for state taxation, for in many businesses intangible assets are
exceedingly productive. Thus a busy newspaper has a definite "going concern
value" which greatly surpasses the value of its equipment. Unless the "in lieu"
tax is imposed on gross receipts, many of these valuable intangible assets escape
assessment.
28. Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Richmond, 99 Va. 102, 37 S. E. 789 (1901).
29. United States Glue Co. v. Oak Creek, 247 U. S. 321 (1918). In Maine
v. Grand Trunk Ry., 142 U. S. 217 (1891), the Court sustained a tax interpreted
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A formidable body of Supreme Court decisions has protected interstate com-
merce from the perils of a state privilege tax.30 The foundation for this series
of judicial assertions seems to have been the case of Robbins v. Shelby County
Taxing District,31 where the Court held that a flat fee privilege tax was invalid
as applied to a drummer soliciting sales from samples for future shipment
from an out-of-state point, when the taxing statute exempted regularly licensed
houses of business in the taxing district from the operation of this privilege tax,
though the resident businesses were forced to pay a tax on their stock of goods
and a privilege tax as well. Justice Bradley, speaking for the Court, conceded
that goods shipped from another state are taxable by the receiving state as part
of the state's general property. Such a tax is invalid only if it discriminates
against the goods of foreign origin. He declared, however, that ". . . to
tax the sale of such goods, or the offer to sell them, before they are brought into
the state, is a very different thing, and seems to us clearly a tax on interstate
commerce itself."3 2 The majority refused to adopt actual discrimination as the
test of the validity of a tax so closely affecting the sale, asserting: "Interstate
commerce cannot be taxed at all, even though the same amount of tax should be
laid on domestic commerce, or that which is carried on solely within the state."' 3
The actual discrimination test was urged by Mr. Chief Justice Waite, dis-
senting, with whom two justices concurred. He asserted: "The tax is upon the
business, and this I have always understood to be lawful, whether the business
was carried on by a citizen of the state under whose authority the exaction was
made, or a citizen of another state, unless there was discrimination against citizens
of other states."3 4 The dissent anticipated, as well, one of the major reasons
for later modifications of the early rigidity-that failure to tax the negotiation
of interstate sales would operate as discrimination against the negotiation of
local sales and produce a manifestly undesirable result.3 5  The majority's
response to this objection, that this is the fault of the taxing state which might
avoid such difficulty by imposing no tax at all on such negotiations, local or in-
terstate,36 seems illogical in view of the necessity of state taxation in some form.
As an absolute assertion of doctrinal principle, the Robbins case doctrine was
somewhat weakened by a decision of the Court three years later, Ficklen V. Shelby
County Taxing Distriet.Y7 The Court sustained a tax upon brokers in the taxing
district who gave a bond to report their gross commissions at the end of a year.
The tax was determined by a percentage of the year's commissions. The broker
terpreted by the Court in Galveston H. & S. A. Ry. v. Texas, 210 U. S. 217 (1908),
as a property tax. See Comment (1930) 18 CALIF. L. REV. 512.
30. Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., 120 U. S. 489 (1887); Real Silk
Hosiery Mills v. Portland, 268 U. S. 325 (1925). Lockhart, The Sales Tax in
Interstate Commerce (1939) 52 HARv. L. REv. 617, n. 10. This article was cited
by the majority in the Berwind-White case.
31. 120 U. S. 489 (1887).
32. Id. at 497.
33. Ibid.
34. Id. at 500.
35. Id. at 501.
36. Id. at 499.
37. 145 U. S. 1 (1892).
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against whom the tax was assessed negotiated all interstate sales. In distinguish-
ing the Robbins case, the Court stated that the tax in that case was, in effect, on
Robbins' principals rather than on Robbins, "while here the tax was clearly
levied upon complainants in respect of the general commission business they
conducted, and their property engaged therein, or their profits realized there-
from."38 The" only real distinction between the cases, however, seems to be in the
means of determining the tax.39 Such a means of determination, it is submitted,
should not be the criterion; the effect on interstate commerce should be the test
used by the courts. The dissent asserted that the taxing plan which saved
the instant tax was a "very clever device to enable the Taxing District of Shelby
County to sustain its government by taxation upon interstate commerce."140
The apparent conclusion to be drawn from the Robbins and Ficklen cases, on
the basis of the distinction between the facts of the cases, seems weakened by the
dictum of the Court in Crew Levick Co. v. Pennsylvania.41 After stating that as
far as the question of gross receipts tax was concerned there was no difference
between interstate and foreign commerce, 42 the Court proceeds to hold that "That
portion of the tax which is measured by the receipts from foreign commerce
necessarily varies in proportion to the volume of that commerce, and hence is a
direct burden upon it." 4 3
The "immunity doctrine" reached its climax in a series of injunction cases.
In Bowman v. Continental Oil Co.,44 the Court approved an injunction against
the imposition of a tax upon the sale of goods requiring subsequent interstate
38. Id. at 21.
39. It is true that the tax of the Ficklen case is not a direct levy upon a
percentage of gross receipts, but since the tax was a fixed percentage of a com-
mission which in turn was a fixed percentage of the amount of sales receipts, the
tax is in fact a percentage levy, as contrasted with the flat fee of the Robbins case.
Query, did the fact that the tax was a step removed from an imposition directly
upon the gross receipts influence the Court? But compare Gwin, White &
Prince v. Henneford, 305 U. S. 434 (1939), where the tax was a fixed percentage of
commissions, but the commissions were not determined by a percentage of receipts
from sale but by a fixed price on each box of fruit sold. Held: The tax could
not be applied. It would appear that the fact that the tax was a step removed
from the gross receipts exerted no influence on the Court in this latter case. See
note 67, infra.
40. The rationale of the distinction is very capably criticized by Lockhart,
supra note 30, at 630. He states: "It is inconceivable that the same result would
have been reached had the case involved a tax in a fixed amount for doing the
interstate business."2
41. 245 U. S. 292 (1917). Black, J., dissenting in Gwin, White & Prince v.
Henneford, 305 U. S. 434, 453-454 (1939), attributes the origin of the Court's
aversion to the gross receipts tax to the dictum of the Crew Levick case and to
the dictum of United States Glue Co. v. Oak Creek, 247 U. S. 321 (1918), wherein
the Court contrasted the net income tax it sustained with a gross receipts tax
on the apparent assumption that the latter was invalid.
42. 245 U. S, 292, 296 (1917). Lockhart, supra note 30, points out that this
dictum is not sound for the imports-exports clause may prohibit state action
while the commerce clause does not.
43. Id. at 297. It is submitted that the apportionment which sustained the
tax in the Ficklin case was assumed by the word "hence" to invalidate the tax
of the instant case. The reasoning is not altered by the fact that the tax was in
the buyer's state while the Crew Levick tax was in the exporting state.
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shipment. A year later, the Court, in Texas Co. v. Brown,45 sustained an injunc-
tion against an excessive inspection fee imposed by the state of Georgia. Powel46
concludes that the latter case establishes the proposition that an interstate sale,
one requiring shipment of the goods into the taxing state in fulfillment of the
contract of sale, is immune from a state tax imposed on the sale.
The Court gave judicial recognition to the pressing necessity for state taxa-
tion in Sonneborn Bros. v. Cureton,47 decided shortly more than a year after Texas
Co. v. Brown. The taxpayer had shipped oil into Texas from outside the state
and sold it from company storehouses in the original, unbroken package. In sus-
taining an "occupation tax" of two per cent of the gross amount from the sale of
the oil, the Court rejected the argument that sale is the final step in interstate
commerce and thus the tax was a direct burden upon one of the steps of the
interstate commerce. The Court adopted the distinction of Woodruff V. Parham,4
"that the immunity (of an import) attaches to the import itself before sale, while
the immunity in case of an article because of its relation to interstate commerce
depends on the question whether the tax challenged regulates or burdens interstate
commerce." 49  The Texas authorities had made no effort to impose the gross
receipts tax upon the sales requiring subsequent interstate shipment. The Court
was not, then, bound to discuss such an imposition, still it flatly asserted: "Many
of the sales by the appellants were made by them before the oil to fulfill the sales
was sent to Texas. These were properly treated by the state authorities as
exempt from state taxation. They were in effect contracts for the sale and de-
livery of the oil across state lines. The soliciting of orders for such sales is
equally exempt. Such transactions are interstate commerce in its essence and
any state tax upon it is a regulation of it and a burden upon it." 50 Though the
statement was dictum, it was authoritative dictum and the majority in the
Berwind-White case was forced to deny it.51
The Sonneborn case marked the climax of a period when the Court, without
adequately justifying its stand, had condemned the taxation of what were tech-
nically interstate sales, but sanctioned the imposition of taxes upon sales after
the interstate shipment was complete. It is submitted that such a distinction is
unsound, for the time of shipment has never been the reason for invalidating a
gross receipts tax; the basic reason has always been the prevention of the im-
position of a burden upon interstate commerce. 52
Three later cases5 3 chose a new criterion for testing the validity of the gross
45. 258 U. S. 466 (1922).
46. Powell, New Light on Gross Receipts Taxes (1940) 53 HARv. L. Rnv.
909, 914.
47. 262 U. S. 506 (1923).
48. 8 Wall. 123 (U. S. 1868).
49. 262 U. S. 506, 510 (1923).
50. Id. at 515.
51. 309 U. S. 33, 36 (1940).
52. The distinction is abolished by the Berwind-White case, id. at 55.
53. Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U. S. 250 (1938) ; Adams
Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U. S. 307 (1938); Gwin, White & Prince v. Henneford,
305 U. S. 434 (1939).
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receipts tax. These cases expressed the rule that a state tax affecting interstate
commerce was invalid if it exposed the commerce to the threat of multiple tax
burdens.
In Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue,54 the Court sustained a tax of
two per cent on the income from sales of advertising space by a publisher, although
part of the advertising came from outside the taxing state as a result of extra-
state solicitation, and although the circulation of the magazine embraced several
states. The Court recognized that the purpose of the interstate commerce clause
was not to relieve the interstate trader from paying his just share of the state
tax even though the cost of doing business was increased.55 The Court announced
its "multiple burden" plan by a justification for the judicial condemnation of
past taxes:
"The vice characteristic of those (local taxes measured by gross
receipts) which have been held invalid is that they have placed on the
commerce burdens of such a nature as to be capable, in point of substance,
of being imposed . . . or added to . . . with equal right by
every state which the commerce touches, merely because interstate com-
merce is being done, so that without the protection of the commerce
clause it would bear cumulative burdens not imposed on local com-
merce." 56
In the instant case the Court further observed that the events on which the
tax was based could be taxed in no other state than the one seeking to impose
the tax in question.57
In Adams Manufacturing Co. v. Storen,5 8 the Court refused to sanction the
application of a "gross income tax" measured by a certain percentage of gross
receipts to a local company selling 80% of its products to out-of-state customers,
when the goods were sold on order from company salesmen, shipped from Indiana
to the out-of-state purchasers, and the remittance made to the home office. The
Court grounded its decision upon the "multiple burden" doctrine rather than
upon the "immunity" doctrine of the older cases. 59 Some years before, in AmeriEcan
Manufacturing Co. v. St. Louis,60 the Court had sustained a license tax measured
by percentage of the gross receipts of the previous year's sales, as applied to a
manufacturing company which removed its products to an out-of-state ware-
54. 303 U. S. 250 (1938), (1939) 52 HARV. L. Rnv. 502, (1938) 86 U. OF PA.
L. REv. 787.
55. Id. at 254.
56. Id. at 255. Thus presented, the doctrine furnishes a rationalization of the
views of the older cases and an attempt to formulate a basis for the solution of
future problems. Clearly the doctrine is not new; it is a natural outgrowth of the
fears of the Court in the older cases. See Note (1940) 40 COL. L. REV. 653.
57. Id. at 260. The reason, it is submitted, is not in accord with the "multiple
burden" doctrine, for other events which could easily be made the subject of
taxation occur in other states. The majority in the Berwind-White case advances
the same contention and the dissent there advances its logical refutation.
58. 304 U. S. 307 (1938), (1939) 4 Mo. L. REv. 64.
59. Id. at 211: ". . . the exaction is of such a character that if lawful
it may in substance be laid to the fullest extent by States in which the goods are
sold as well as those in which they are manufactured. Interstate commerce
would thus be subjected to the risk of a double tax burden to which intrastate
commerce is not exposed, and which the commerce clause forbids."
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house from which they were sold to out-of-state customers. The Court in
the Adams case distinguished the American Manufacturing Co. case as being
a tax on the privilege of manufacture, and not a sales tax.61 The distinction
is plainly unsound if the rationale of earlier cases, the protection of inter-
state commerce from the barriers of state taxation, is followed. Clearly, the
name applied to a tax does not alleviate the burden it imposes upon interstate
trade. Nor is the fact that a different year is chosen as a basis of measurement a
valid ground of distinction, since such a basis is not relevant to the extent of the
handicap imposed on interstate commerce. A well-written dissent by Justice
Black in the Adams case pointed out that if the nominal designation of the taxes
were disregarded, and the Court were to consider the operative effect of the two
taxes, the tax burdens were identical.62 Further, Justice Black's dissent furnished
the most practical study of the gross receipts problem of any decision in the
history of the subject. After pointing out that taxation and regulation are not
synonymous, and that a tax may affect commerce without regulating it in the
constitutional sense,63 he observed that taxes based on net income are admittedly
valid, and that "failure to make a profit should not of itself create a constitutional
exemption from a tax which the State might otherwise impose." 64 His most
important criticism was directed toward the newly asserted "multiple burden"
doctrine. He admitted that unfair burdens should be avoided, but argued that the
Constitution was never intended to give interstate commerce a preferred status
over intrastate commerce or to relieve interstate commerce from paying for the
protection which the taxing state afforded it. Justice Black felt that only Congress
had the power to formulate rules, regulations and laws to protect interstate
commerce from the threat of possible future burdens.6 5
The dissent's most convincing argument carried the "multiple burden" doc-
trine to its logical conclusion with the realization that if mere possibility of
exposure to a burden may be enough to invalidate a tax, then no.tax could be
levied at any stage of an interstate product's history, for any tax operates as
one of the multiple burdens which the doctrine seems to fear. Finding in the
61. 304 U. S. 307, 313 (1938).
62. Id. at 329. There seems to be a logical basis for either interpretation of
the tax of the American Mfg. Co. case. Justice Black's approach, a consideration
of the operative effect of the tax, is the more practicable solution of the problem
in light of the ultimate aims of the commerce clause. If the tax is viewed, however,
as it was by the Court in the American Mfg. Co. case and by the majority in the
Adams case, as a condition precedent to the right to carry on a local business,
manufacturing, with the ascertainment of the value of the goods postponed until
the time of sale, the tax would be valid. Horn Silver Mining Co. v. New York,
143 U. S. 305 (1892); New York v. Roberts, 171 U. S. 658 (1898). It may be
questionable, however, whether the "entire business" of the American Manufactur-
ing Co., as taxed, did not include an interstate sale. Cf. Ozark Pipe Line Corp. v.
Monier, 266 U. S. 555 (1925).
63. Id. at 320.
64. Id. at 326. This argument, however, leaves unanswered the determinative
query as to the actual burdening of interstate commerce. Clearly a gross income
tax burdens such commerce more than a net income tax, which can affect only
company profits.
65. Id. at 328.
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state of Indiana a taxable event, the receipt of income, which could not be taxed
in any other state, Justice Black felt a tax could be imposed thereon.0
The third case applying the "multiple burden" doctrine was Gwin, White &
Prince v. Henneford.6 7 The State of Washington had imposed a tax for the
privilege of engaging in business activities, measured by a percentage of gross
receipts. The Court held the tax could not be applied to a marketing agent with
principle offices in Washington, who usually made shipments of produce to out-
of-state representatives whose duty it was to negotiate sales, make deliveries,
and remit the purchase money to the home offices. Justice Stone, speaking for the
majority, made the questionable assertion that the risk of a multiple burden
amounted to actual discrimination, and for this reason the tax could not be sus-
tained.68
Again Justice Black dissented, asserting his arguments in the dissent of the
Adams case, and new ones as well. Once more he asserted that in so vigorous a
protection against discrimination against interstate commerce, the Court, as a
practical matter, discriminated against local commerce. 69 Further, he asserted
that the time to solve the problem of future burdens was when the future burdens
arose.70 There would be no problem of double taxation, he declared, for as betveen
the buyer's and seller's states, earlier cases had held the buyer's state could not
tax the receipts of such a sale.71 Justice Black attributed the dangers con-
templated by the "multiple burden" theory to our federal system, since they were
the price paid by the interstate business man for governmental protection and
maintenance in all the states where he did business.72 As a problem of Federalism,
he felt they should be dealt with by Congress. He urged the propriety of sanction-
ing the gross receipts tax instead of the net receipts tax because of the ease
of concealment and uncertainty which the latter tax entails,73 and because the
gross receipts may be a clearer indicia of benefit received from the state govern-
ment than would the annual profit and loss statement.7 4 Since he felt the problem
66. Id. at 330. Compare the dissenting assertion of Hughes, C. J., in the
Berwind-White case that it is not the fact that the single event may not be taxed
in another state which controls, but the fact that there are other taxable events
in other states which cumulatively form a burden or the possibility thereof.
67. 305 U. S. 434 (1939). Cf. Ficklen v. Shelby County Taxing District, 145
U. S. 1 (1892), distinguished by the Court as being a tax apportioned to the
activities taxed, "all of which are intrastate." Query, were all the activities taxed
in the Ficklen case intrastate? Such activities were intrastate as to the place
where they were done, but interstate in the sense they were part of the interstate
transaction. Query, does the above distinction indicate that extraterritoriality
was a basis of the Gwin, White & Prince Court? See note 75, infra.
68. Id. at 439: "The present tax, though nominally local, thus in its practical
operation discriminates against interstate commerce, since it imposes upon it,
merely because interstate commerce is being done, the risk of a multiple burden
to which local commerce is not exposed."
69. Id. at 442.
70. Id. at 445.
71. Id. at 447.
72. Id. at 448.
73. Id. at 448.
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of apportionment was a Congressional power, he warned the Court to "scrupulous-
ly observe its constitutional limitations. . .. 75
The Gwin, White & Prince case marked the climax of the Court's application
of the "multiple burden" doctrine which, during this period, had clearly replaced
the "immunity doctrine" advanced by the older cases. Although its rationale was
faulty, the "multiple burden" doctrine was a distinct liberalization of such dog-
matic pronunciations as those of the Robbins case.70 Once this liberalization had
begun, its extension to eradicate the irrational doctrines that hindered its growth
was inevitable.
One of the greatest forward teps taken by the Court in this process was in its
affirmance by memorandum" of the decision of the Supreme Court of Alabama in
Graybar Electric Co. v. Curry.78 A company with Alabama offices was required
to pay a license tax of two per cent of the gross receipts of its sales, although part
of the goods sold were in response to local orders which were in turn ordered
from out-of-state companies and shipped directly to the purchaser. It is un-
fortunate that the Court felt the facts so clear or the decision so unimportant
that there was no necessity for explaining the affirmance in detail. The facts
permit of no other conclusion than that a technically interstate sale may be the
subject of a state tax. The case, on its facts, is clearly contra to the "immunity"
principle established for an interstate sale by Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing
District, and the dictum of Sonneborn Bros. v. Cureton. The Graybar Electric
case with the Use Tax cases forms a firm basis for the latest advancement, that
of the Court in the Berwind-White case.
The memorandum opinion of the Court sustained the tax of the Graybar
Electric case on the authority of Banker Bros. v. Pennsylvania79 and Wiloil Cor-
poration v. Pennsylvania.80 The Banker Bros. case sustained a percentage tax
on the sales of a retail dealer who took orders for automobiles and then purchased
the cars from an out-of-state company. The cars were shipped to the dealer, who
delivered them to the purchaser. Despite the taxpayer's assertion that the entire
transaction amounted to one interstate sale with the dealer as agent for the
75. Id. at 455. Justice Black in summarizing his doctrine, declared: "I would
return to the rule that-except for state acts designed to impose discriminatory
burdens on interstate commerce because it is interstate-Congress alone must
'determine how far [interstate commerce] . . . shall be free and untram-
melled, how far it shall be burdened by duties and imposts, and how far it shall
be prohibited.'"
The facts of the Gwin, White & Prince case permit of a rational explanation
of the result which might be approved by a court impressed with Justice Black's
approach. While the fruit sold in the instant case was in part shipped directly
to the purchaser, more often it was consigned to the taxpayer at extra state
points from which it was diverted to purchasers who bought the fruit while in
transit, or where it was stored, outside the taxing state, pending sale. As to this
fruit, the tax, which was purportedly on "business activities," was on activities
outside the venue of the taxing state. But cf. American Mfg. Co. v. St. Louis,
250 U. S. 459 (1919).
76. Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., 120 U. S. 489 (1887).
77. 308 U. S. 513 (1939).
78. 238 Ala. 116, 189 So. 186 (1939).
79. 222 U. S. 210 (1911).
80. 294 U. S. 169 (1935).
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manufacturer, the Court held that there were two separate sales. One of the sales,
by the manufacturer to the dealer, was interstate, while the other, from the
dealer to the purchaser, was local. The tax was upon the local sale. The Court
felt that the purchaser did not contemplate an interstate sale, that it was im-
material to him where the dealer obtained the car.81
The Wiloil case sanctioned the imposition of a Pennsylvania tax on liquid
fuels, levied on a seller whose agents took orders for the fuels in Pennsylvania.
The orders were sent to Delaware to be filled, and the oil was shipped from
Delaware to the Pennsylvania purchaser. Although the order blank specified, as
to price, "f. o. b. Wilmington, Del., plus 3 cents tax," the Court held the interstate
commerce was neither required nor contemplated and was merely incidental. It
has been pointed out82 that the Wiloil case would seem to indicate that in differ-
entiating an interstate from an intrastate sale, the contemplation of the parties
as to the point of shipment is immaterial, that whether or not a sale is interstate
will depend on whether or not the contract of the parties requires an interstate
transit. The Graybar Electric case goes even further in its modification of the
contemplation test. In this case the contract between the parties expressly
stipulated, "It is agreed that the material covered by this contract shall be manu-
factured at the plant . . . located in . Ohio and shipped in interstate
movement from said plant to destination ."83 This contract provision would
apparently require an interstate shipment, yet the state court refused to prohibit
the taxation of the sale, reasoning that the means by which and the place from
which the goods were obtained were mere incidents of the transaction and did
not change its status, that such interstate shipment was of no benefit to the
purchaser as it did not change the sale price, and that the parties could not by
contract make a sale interstate to procure its immunity.8 4 The Graybar Electric
case, then, holds that merely because a sale entails, contemplates, or requires an
interstate shipment, does not prevent taxation of the sale by the buyer's state.
The second basis for the Berwind-White case was laid by the Court in the
Use Tax cases.8 5 In Henneford v. Silas Mason Co.,86 the Court sustained the
application of the Washington "Compensating Use Tax,"87 as applied to machinery
purchased at retail in other states. Justice Cardozo, speaking for the majority,
adopted a philosophy of taxation which served as the basis for the reasoning of
the other Use Tax cases and of the majority in the Berwind-White case. He
states:
81. 222 U. S. 210, 214 (1911); but cf. Spalding & Bros. v. Edwards, 262 U. S.
66 (1923).
82. Warren and Schlesinger, Sales and Use Taxes: Interstate Commerco
Pays Its Way (1938) 38 COL. L. REV. 49.
83. 238 Ala. 116, 189 So. 186, 188 (1939) (italics supplied).
84. Id. at 118, 189 So. at 190.
85. Comment (1939) 4 Mo. L. REv. 312.
86. 300 U. S. 577 (1937).
87. The tax was two per cent of the purchase price of any personal property
purchased at retail. The taxing statute did not apply to the use of any article
which had already been subjected to a use or sales tax equal to or in excess of
the Washington tax, and provided for deductions if another use or sales tax
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"The privilege of use is only one attribute, among many, of the bundle
of privileges that make up property ownership. . . A state is at
liberty, if it pleases, to tax them all collectively, or to separate the
faggots and lay the charge distributively."88
The state tax, he held, was not upon the operations of interstate commerce,
but upon use, one attribute of ownership, and, since interstate commerce was at
an end, and the tax was not measured or conditioned to hamper or discriminate
against interstate commerce transactions, the tax was valid.
Although it would appear that the fact that exemptions were made by the
taxing statute for other use or sales tax payments would prevent a multiple
burden on the article of interstate commerce, and hence on the commerce itself, the
Court did not fear any such possibility and did not assert the necessity of such a
compensation for validity of the taxing statute.3 9 Further, the Court felt that
the danger of multiple burdens should be met when the multiple burdens arose.90
In Felt & Tarrant Manufacturing Co. v. Gallagher,91 the Court sustained the
California use tax which made no provision for allowance for other use or sales
taxes. This decision, on its facts, would seem to further the conclusion that the
risk of future multiple burdens was of no importance in the consideration of such
a tax. In Southern Pacific Co. v. Gallagher92 and Pacific Telephone & Telegraph
Co. v. Gallagher,93 the Court faced the narrower question of the validity of the
use tax upon an article which was brought into the taxing state from outside the
state and installed, usually for immediate use, in interstate commerce. The Court
still found a taxable moment between the bringing in and that installation when
the tax could be applied. 94
From the Robbins case to the Berwind-White decision was a radical change
in judicial attitude, but from the Graybar Electric case and the Use Tax cases to
the Berwind-White decision was a mere step. Insofar as the operative effect of the
taxes is concerned, a mere substitution of names would change the "privilege"
or "license" tax of the Graybar Electric case, or the use tax of the Silas Mason
case to the sales tax of the Berwind-White case. In each decision, the Court al-
lowed a tax measured by the retail sales price to be levied by the buyer's state.
In the Silas Mason case, the tax was levied upon the purchaser. In the Berwind-
White case the taxing provision stipulated that the "tax shall be paid by the pur-
chaser to the vendor" and, in turn, the vendor was authorized to collect the tax.95
88. 300 U. S. 577, 582 (1937). Cf. Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U. S. 124, 136-8
(1929).
89. Id. at 587: "A state, for many purposes, is to be reckoned as a self-con-
tained unit, which may frame its own system of burdens and exemptions without
heeding systems elsewhere."
90. Ibid. "If there are limits to that power (state taxing power), there is no
need to mark them now. It will be time enough to mark them when a taxpayer
paying in the state of origin is compelled to pay again in the state of destination."
91. 306 U. S. 62 (1939).
92. 306 U. S. 167 (1939).
93. 306 U. S. 182 (1939).
94. The latter two cases are authority, as well, for the proposition of the
Felt & Tarrant case, that no compensation need be made for other use or sales
taxes.
95. 309 U. S. 33, 43 (1940).
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It is true, as the dissent pointed out,96 that the vendor is made liable as an insurer
for the payment of the tax to the city,97 still the designation of the purchaser as
the primary taxpayer is clear. In the Graybar Electric case the seller is designated
as the primary taxpayer; 98 still he is required under penalty to collect the tax
from the consumer. In all three cases, therefore, the tax is a consumer's tax.
In the Graybar Electric and Berwind-White cases the tax is upon the sale,
while in the Silas Mason case the tax is upon the use. Insofar as the operative
effect of these two utilizations of property is concerned, two more similar sticks
could not be found in Justice Cardozo's bundle of faggots.9 9 "The difference be-
tween the two is a difference of words and a difference of an infinitesimal moment
of time, between the second of first receiving and the second of first having
received."'100 With able precedents laid, the great remaining question was the
validity of a sales tax upon a transaction interstate in nature. The Berwind-
White case answered that question.
Justice Stone, speaking for the majority in the Berwind-White case, sets forth
a new and specific approach for the consideration of a gross receipts tax in a
given situation. As guides for any decision he recommends that the Court
consider:
1. The purpose of the commerce clause-to protect interstate commerce from
discriminatory or destructive state action.
2. The purpose of the state taxing power, where interstate commerce must
bear its just share of the state tax burden.
3. The necessity of judicial reconciliation of the competing demands.10 '
He points out that the mere fact that an incidental or consequential effect
of a tax is an increase in the cost of doing the business does not relieve interstate
commerce from the duty of paying its just share of the state taxing burden.10 2
Some taxes, Justice Stone concedes, do impede or destroy interstate commerce.
96. Id. at 60.
97. Id. at 42.
98. 238 Ala. 116, 189 So. 186, 189 (1939).
99. See the opinion of Cardozo, J., in Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U. S.
577, 582 (1937).
100. Powell. supra note 46, at 930. Hughes, C. J., dissenting in the Berwind-
White case, 309 U. S. 33, 66 (1940), does not attempt to make any distinction
between the operative effect of the two taxes. He asserts: "The fact that a use
tax, sustained as a tax upon an attribute of property which is subject to thejurisdiction of the State, may have an incidental or indirect effect upon interstate
commerce, and thus in the opinion of commentators may tend to discourage in-
terstate transactions, is certainly no excuse for going further and upholding the
action of States which, looking with a jealous eye upon the freedom of interstate
commerce, attempt to lay a direct tax upon that commerce." Query, does not the
Washington Compensating Use Tax recognize such an identity of effect by allow-
ing a compensation for either a sales or use tax previously paid?
101. 309 U. S. 33, 49 (1940).
102. Id. at 46. This contention seems to be a realization of a fundamental
economic doctrine, that any tax imposed at any time will affect the interstate
transaction adversely. Thus the Court's citation of cases where a tax is levied
on net income, on the interstate commerce instrumentality, on interstate property
before the interstate movement or after its completion, on use or withdrawal for
use, is appropriate. So long as any governmental agency levies any tax, it is
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The characteristic of these taxes is that they impose a burden which the in-
trastate commerce does not bear and thus place interstate commerce at such a
disadvantage that if the tax were sustained the tax may easily result in harm
of a national concern. 103 Stone finds this evil absent from the instant tax which
he asserts does not aim at or discriminate against interstate commerce. He finds
the tax one conditioned upon a local activity, delivery in New York, and thus
he can discern no actual difference between this tax and the use or general property
tax.
The dissent, citing the Western Live Stock and Gwin, White & Prince cases,
advances the "multiple burden" doctrine as a basis for its opinion. 0 4 The
majority opinion does not expressly repudiate this doctrine, but finds that
analagous cases which assert the doctrine are distinguishable. 05 It is submitted
that the dissenting opinion is sound in its assertion that on the facts the "multiple
burden" doctrine is clearly applicable and that in this respect the. facts, if not the
words, of the majority deny the validity of that doctrine as asserted by preceding
cases.10 6
The majority rejects the traditional distinction of the Sonneborn case between
a tax laid on sales made without previous contract after the merchandise has
crossed the state line and sales, the contracts for which contemplate or require
shipment of the merchandise into the taxing state. 0 7 The reasoning of the Court
is that there is no showing that the fact that a contract of sale is made before
the interstate shipment, results in a greater burden on interstate commerce than
if the contract or sale is negotiated after the goods have been shipped into the
state.
Confronted with its greatest difficulty, that of distinguishing the doctrine
and rationale of the Robbins case, the majority failed to press its new doctrine
to its fullest measure and asserted that the rule of the Robbins case "has been
narrowly limited to fixed-sum license taxes imposed on the business of soliciting
orders for the purchase of goods to be shipped interstate."' 08
Such a distinction seems inadequate. It would seem that a court whose impell-
ing motive is the approval of non-discriminatory state taxation should discredit
103. Id. at 48.
104. Id. at 68.
105. Id. at 50: "The only challenge . . . is by reference to unconstitu-
tional 'burdens' on interstate commerce made in general statements which are
inapplicable here because they are torn from their setting in judicial opinions
and speak of state regulations or taxes of a different kind, laid in different cir-
cumstances from those with which we are now concerned."
106. Hughes, C. J., dissenting, agrees that the taxable event found by the
majority, delivery in New York, is not taxable in any other state, but asserts that
the argument misses the point. "The shipment, the transshipment and the de-
livery of the coal are but parts of a unitary interstate transaction. They are
integral parts of an interstate sale. If, because of the delivery in New York,
that State can tax the gross receipts from the sale, why cannot Pennsylvania
by reason of the shipment of the coal in that State tax the gross receipts there?"
Id. at 68. The argument is the same, the example almost identical, with that
offered by Stone, J., writing the majority opinion in Gwin, White & Prince v.
Henneford, 305 U. S. 434, 438 (1939).
107. 309 U. S. 33, 53 (1940).
108. Id. at 57.
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a case which rejected discrimination as the test of validity.100 Had the "immunity
doctrine" of the Robbins case been expressly overruled, the Berwind-Whito case
might have permitted of the generalization that a non-discriminatory state tax
upon the gross receipts of a local corporation's sales would be valid. With the
distinction made by the Court, there is still room for some doubt as to the
accuracy of such an absolute assertion. The distinction made by the Court is
the same used in the decision of the Ficklen case to distinguish the Robbins case.
The distinctions are equally illogical."10
Chief Justice Hughes, speaking for the dissent states: "If the question now
before us is controlled by precedent, the result would seem to be clear."'' Despite
majority assertions to the contrary 12 the statement seems to be accurate insofar
as the previous approaches of the Court are concerned. The dissent's reasoning
rests heavily upon the "multiple burden" doctrine'1 8 and upon the view that lack
of discrimination will not preserve the validity of the tax."14 Both of these reasons
seem discredited by the majority opinion.
The Berwind-White case furnishes the states with a practicable taxing plan.
While the seller's state may not impose a sales tax measured by the seller's
gross receipts, 1 5 the buyer's state may tax the sale by the same measure. Two
opposed lines of reasoning support two basically inconsistent doctrines which to-
gether form one uniform taxing pattern. What the result will be if the same
reasoning is used in the entire field remains an open question. If the "immunity
doctrine" approach of the Robbins case is used, neither state could impose a tax
measured by the gross receipts from the sale. If the Berwind-White approach is
used, either state could impose such a tax, and clearly an actual burden on inter-
state commerce would arise. Thus, a uniform rationale would impose the alterna-
tive of either two taxes or none at all-discrimination against interstate com-
109. 120 U. S. 489, 497 (1887); Cf. Real Silk Hosiery Mills v. Portland, 268
U. S. 325 (1925).
110. See notes 39 and 40, supra. Compare Wagner v. Covington, 251 U. S. 95
(1919), where the Court held valid a fiat fee imposed on a company bringing soft
drinks into the taxing state on trucks and selling from these trucks to local
buyers, with Sonneborn Bros. v. Cureton, 262 U. S. 506 (1923), where a per-
centage tax was sustained on the gross receipts from the sale of goods sold after
their arrival in the taxing state. Query, since the priority in time of shipment
or sale is not relevant to the test of the burden on interstate commerce, do these
two cases cast doubt on the distinction of the Berwind-White case between a
fiat fee and a percentage tax? Query in the Wagner case as to the validity of
the differentiation between "drummers" and "peddlers" to distinguish the
Robbins case.
111. 309 U. S. 33, 63 (1940).
112. Id. at 50: ". . . unless we are now to reject the plain teaching of this
line of sales tax decisions, extending back for more than seventy years . .
the present tax must be upheld."
113. Id. at 67.
114. Ibid.
115. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U. S. 307 (1938); Gwin, White & Prince
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merce or discrimination against local commerce. It is possible then that the answer
may be sought in Congressional action, as Justice Black recommended.1
16
JOHN H. GUNN
DuRESs: A DOUBLE CONCEPT
At common law "duress" was confined to duress by imprisonment, and
duress per minas, or by threats. Duress per minas included only threats of
injury to the person by loss of life, loss of liberty, loss of limb, or mayhem,1 for
it was said that only these threats, as distinguished from a threat to batter, or
a threat to destroy one's goods, were sufficient to cause fear to a brave and
courageous man.
2
From this statement of the early common law doctrine we see that duress
is composed of, or comprehends, two concepts. There is, first, the conduct of the
party exercising the threats; second, the mental or emotional condition of the
party upon whom the threats are exercised. In other words, duress consists
of wrongful conduct by the duressor producing fear, in the duressee, so that the
latter is not capable of giving his free assent.
3
It is sometimes said that the reason why an instrument obtained by duress
may be avoided is that the party upon whom the duress has been exercised has
been deprived of his capacity to assent, and that, therefore, the instrumeit
which he has signed is not in fact his contract.4 It is doubtless true in some
cases that duress may completely prevent the mutual assent necessary for the
formation of a contract. Thus, if a man by force compels another to go through
certain manifestations of assent, as by taking his hand and forcibly guiding
it, there is no real expression of mutual assent for the act is not that of him
whose hand is guided.5 If an instrument is obtained by duress such as this,
there is a lack of mutual assent in fact, and such instrument is void and nuga-
tory.0 But in the normal case in which duress is exercised, while there is an
116. Dissenting in Gwin, White & Prince v. Henneford, 305 U. S. 434, 448
(1939). Such Congressional action is discussed in Comment (1940) 38 MICH. L.
REV. 1292, 1308.
1. 1 BL. Comm. *95; In re Nightingale's Estate, 182 S. C. 527, 189 S. E.
890 (1936); 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1937) § 1601; Notes (1938) 22 MINN. L.
REV. 891, (1932) 7 WASH. L. REv. 248.
2. 1 BL. COMM. *95; In re Nightingale's Estate, 182 S. C. 527, 189 S. E.
890 (1936).
3. Galusha v. Sherman, 105 Wis. 263, 81 N. W. 495 (1900); Williamson,
Halsell, Frazier Co. v. Ackerman, 77 Kan. 502, 94 Pac. 807 (1908); Amer. Nat.
Bank of Lake Crystal v. Helling, 161 Minn. 504, 202 N. W. 20 (1925) ; RESTATE-
MENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 492.
4. See Fairbanks v. Snow, 145 Mass. 153, 13 N. E. 596 (1887); 5 WILLIs-
TON, CONTRACTS (1937) § 1627 A.
5. See McCoy v. McMahon Const. Co., 216 S. W. 770 (Mo. 1919); 5 WIL-
LISTON, CONTRACTS (1937) § 1624.
6. See McCoy v. McMahon Const. Co., 216 S. W. 770 (Mo. 1919).
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actual expression of assent to the transaction in question, the courts regard it as
inequitable to permit the enforcement of the contract in view of the way in which
this assent was obtained,7 and it is with respect to this type of duress that this
note is primarily concerned. Duress of this latter type, in which there is an
actual expression of mutual assent, does not make the contract void, but voidable
only, and subject to ratification.8
The interest of the early common law was directed primarily at the con-
duct of the duressor. In each case the question was this: Would these acts
cause a degree of fear as would subvert the will of a brave and courageous man?
To be sure, the effect of the acts upon the wronged party was necessarily con-
sidered, but the emphasis was placed upon the acts themselves.9
As time passed, a two-fold development in the law took place. First, the
acts which would constitute duress were increased in number. Mayhem, for
instance, was no longer a condition precedent, and was recognized that a threat
to injure a man's wife, child, or other close relative, was as much an act of
duress as was a threat to injure the man himself.O Certain property interests,
also, were included, and a threat to destroy or wrongfully withhold one's prop-
erty was held to be an act sufficient to constitute duress."1
There was, in addition, a second development, relating to the resisting power
of the wronged person. Originally his resisting power was required to be that
7. Fairbanks v. Snow, 145 Mass. 153, 154, 13 N. E. 596, 598 (1887):
"Again the ground upon which a contract is voidable for duress . . . is that
* . . the party has been subjected to an improper motive for action."; Ran-
dolph Co. v. Lewis, 196 N. C. 51, 144 S. E. 545 (1928) ; RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS(1932) § 492, Comment a; 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1937) § 1624; Ames, Spe-
cialty Contracts and Equitable Defenses (1895) 9 HARv. L. REv. 49, 58: "Duress
was, therefore, never regarded as negativing the legal execution of the obligation.";
Pound, Interests of Personality (1915) 28 HARv. L. REV. 343, 358 (recovery was
allowed by way of restitution on equitable principles to prevent unjust enrich-
ment).
If it is true that an instrument obtained by duress is bad because of the
lack of mutual assent, could such an instrument under seal be avoided?
As to the effect of duress on contracts under seal, see Ames, Specialty Con-
tracts and Equitable Defenses (1895) 9 HARv. L. REv. 49, 57: "As far back as
Bracton's time, at least, one who had duly signed and sealed an obligation, and
could not therefore plead non est factum, might still defeat an action by pleading
affirmatively that he was induced to execute the specialty by duress practiced
upon him by the plaintiff."
By the weight of authority, the duressee has no action in tort against the
duressor. Note, Duress as a Tort (1925) 39 HARv. L. REV. 108.
8. Bushnell v. Loomis, 234 Mo. 371, 137 S. W. 257 (1911); Barnette v.
Wells Fargo Nevada Nat. Bank, 270 U. S. 438 (1925); Fairbanks v. Snow, 145
Mass. 153, 13 N. E. 596 (1887); Randolph Co. v. Lewis, 196 N. C. 51, 144 S. B.545 (1928); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 499; 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS(1937) § 1626; Note (1925) 35 A. L. R. 866.
9. See Galusha v. Sherman, 105 Wis. 263, 276, 81 N. W. 495, 499 (1900).
10. Gray v. Freeman, 37 Tex. Civ. App. 556, 84 S. W. 1105 (1905); City
National Bank v. Jusworm, 88 Wis. 188 (1894); Adams v. Irving Nat. Bank, 116
N. Y. 606 (1889).
11. Joannin v. Ogilive, 49 Minn. 564, 52 N. W. 217 (1892) ; Bailey v. Devine,
123 Ga. 653, 51 S. E. 603 (1905); Fenwick Shipping Co. v. Clarke Bros., 133
Ga. 43, 65 S. E. 140 (1909); Berger v. Bonnell Motor Co., 4 N. J. Misc. 589, 133
Atl. 778 (1926); 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1937) § 1617 (cases cited in note
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of a brave and courageous man,12 a standard objective in nature. Gradually
this standard was altered, first to the resisting power of a man of ordinary firm-
ness,13 and more recently to the resisting power of the particular plaintiff in-
volved.14 It was realized that the weak and the timid were precisely those most
in need of protection, 5 and it seems proper to describe the present standard of
resistence as one subjective in nature, since it concerns, primarily, the particular
plaintiff alleging the duress and not a hypothetical bold and courageous man.
Throughout this two-fold development, however, and even under the sub-
jective resisting power standard, it seems that the fundamental emphasis was
on the acts or conduct of the duressor. The constant inquiry related to the
acts performed, and the question was: Were these acts (whether acts of
violence to the person or acts of destruction to his property) sufficient to subvert
the will of the party alleging the duress (whether he be a brave man, a man of
ordinary firmness, or this particular man)? This is not to say that there was
a inquiry as to the state of mind of the duressee. There could be no duress as
against a graven image. But the point is one of emphasis, and the emphasis
was on the act.
The trend of the modern decisions, however, points to a shift in emphasis.
In determining whether or not duress has been exercised, modern courts tend
to emphasize the second of the two concepts of which duress is composed, namely,
the mental or emotional condition of the duressee. Under this new emphasis the
question asked by the courts may be phrased as follows: Was the free agency
or will power of the duressee subverted or coerced by the conduct of the duressor?
The courts are still looking at both conduct and state of mind but with an in-
creasing concentration on the subjective element. This modern approach is
well stated in the leading case of Galusha v. Sherman,16 in which Marshall, J.,
says: ". . . the real foundation principle of duress . . . is that it is
the condition of the mind of the wronged person at the time of the act sought
to be avoided, not the means by which such condition was produced. .,11
That the tendency of recent decisions in many states has been to follow this
new emphasis,' 8 may be seen from a comparison of two cases which apply it.
12. 1 BL. COMM. *95.
13. Wood v. Kansas City Home Telephone Co., 223 Mo. 537, 123 S. W.
6 (1909) ; Doscher v. Schroder, 105 N. J. Eq. 315, 147 At. 781 (1929)
14. Commonwealth v. Motta, 11 N. E. (2d) 428 (Mass. 1937) (conduct suf-
ficient to overcome an ordinary person's will need not be shown, but only con-duct overcoming mind and will of person in question); Bond State Bank v.
Vaughn, 241 Ky. 524, 44 S. W. (2d) 527 (1931).
15. Parmentier v. Pater, 13 Ore. 121, 9 Pac. 59 (1885).
16. 105 Wis. 263, 81 N. W. 495 (1900).
17. 105 Wis. 263, 274, 81 N. W. 495, 498 (1900).
18. The Galush case is cited and quoted in Callendar Say. Bank v. Loos,
142 Iowa 1, 120 N. W. 317 (1909); Samuels Shoe Co. v. Frensley, 151 Okla.
196, 3 P. (2d) 216 (1931) ; Robertson v. Shinn Groc. Co., 34 S. W. (2d) 367 (Tex.
1930). Also see, Nat. Enameling & Stamping Co. v. St. Louis, 328 Mo. 648, 40
S. W. (2d) 593 (1931): "'Duress' connotes the condition of mind of the
wronged person at the time of the act sought to be avoided rather than the
means by which such condition was procured."; Malmquist v. McChord, 179
Minn. 17, 228 N. W. 167 (1929); Western Paving Co. v. Sifers, 126 Kan. 460,
268 Pac. 803 (1928).
1941]
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In Williamson, Halsell, Frazier Co. v. Ackerman,'9 the defendant's son, who was
an employee of the plaintiff, embezzled from him the sum of $4,000. The plain-
tiff called upon the defendant and threatened to send his son to prison if the
defendant father did not execute certain notes to the plaintiff, secured by a
mortgage on the defendant's home, to secure the embezzled funds. The plain-
tiff carried with him at the time a warrant for the son's arrest, and a constable
was waiting in an adjoining room. The defendant's sister was present and
added her hysterical entreaties to the plaintiff's demands. After a two hour
conference with the plaintiff, during which time the latter continued to threaten
the son, the defendant signed the notes. When the plaintiff sued on these notes
the court held that they were not binding on the defendant because of duress,
saying: "Under the modern theory, duress is to be tested, not by the nature
of the acts or threats, but rather by the state of mind of the victim induced by
such acts and threats.
20
In the case of American National Bank of Lake Crystal v. Helling,21 the
defendants' brother, the cashier in the plaintiff bank, embezzled certain funds
from it. The officers of the bank stated to the defendants that they intended to
inform the bank examiners of this conduct unless some kind of settlement were
made, and that if the examiners were so informed, the brother would be sent to
prison. At this time the mother of the defendants was very ill. The defendants
agreed to pay $18,000 to the plaintiff to make good the fund embezzled by the
brother. The agreement was not performed, and in an action brought thereon
the defendants contended that they made the agreement not only to prevent
their brother from going to prison, but also to save their mother from the
shock of this disgrace. It was shown that the negotiations for the settlement
had continued over a two week period, during which time the defendants had
had the advice of their friends, one of whom was a banker, and of their counsel.
The court held that no duress had been shown, saying in part, ". . . the
question here is whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain a finding that the
defendants were under such constraint that they were not in condition to make
a valid contract. A careful examination of the record satisfies us that the
facts will not justify a finding that the defendants were influenced or dominated
by the representatives of the bank to such an extent that they lacked capacity
to enter into a binding contract. They had ample time for reflection and did
not act until after full consultation with their friends and counsel."22
In both of these cases the conduct of the duressor was the same: there was
a threat to imprison the defendant's son or brother if the embezzled money
was not returned. In the one case the court found from the facts that the de-
fendant's will was coerced. In the other case the court found that it was not.
It seems clear that, at least as far as these courts are concerned, duress con-
sists fundamentally of the mental condition of the wronged party, whether or
19. 77 Kan. 502, 94 Pac. 807 (1908).
20. Id. at 505, 94 Pac. at 808.
21. 161 Minn. 504, 202 N. W. 20 (1925).
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not his will was coerced or subverted, and that the acts or conduct of the duressor
are merely matters of evidence from which this fact may be found.
The doctrine of duress is much like the doctrine of undue influence in the
making of wills. Undue influence is said to be that influence which destroys
the will of the testator, or substitutes another's volition for his own. 2 3 The
loose language used by some of the courts in speaking of the modern doctrine of
duress would indicate that duress, too, is solely a question of volition. But there
are important differences between undue influence and the type of duress we are
here considering.24 A will executed under undue influence is void; it cannot be
admitted to probate.25 A contract executed under duress is voidable and sub-
ject to ratification. 26 Undue influence need not be exercised by the beneficiary
of the will, nor with his knowledge and consent.27 To set aside a contract because
of duress, the duress must have been exercised by the promisee, or if by someone
else, with the knowledge and consent of the promisee. 28 Since undue influence
is solely a question of volition, it is immaterial whether the acts used to produce
the influence were wrongful acts, in either the legal or ethical meaning of wrong-
ful.29 In duress the acts of the duressor must be wrongful.30
Just what acts will be called wrongful is not clear. A threat to use crim-
inal prosecution for the purpose of private gain is wrongful because it is a
perversion of the criminal process.3 1 It was held to be wrongful for the plaintiff
to induce the defendant to endorse a note by threatening to bring a civil action
which would disclose forgery by the defendant's son, against whom the plain-
tiff had an existing valid claim, because such threat was in effect a threat to
bring criminal prosecution.32 However, the law provides creditors with certain
23. Hayes v. Hayes, 242 Mo. 155, 145 S. W. 115 (1912) ; Davault v. Parks,
190 Ark. 370, 79 S. W. (2d) 68 (1935); In re Donovan's Estate, 114 Cal. App.
228, 299 Pac. 816 (1931); McCollister v. Showers, 216 Iowa 108, 248 N. W.
363 (1933); ATKINSON, WILLS (1937) 211.
24. See note 7, supra.
25. ATKINSON, WILLs (1937) 209.
26. See note 8, supra.
27. Cheney v. Goldy, 225 IlM. 394, 80 N. E. 289 (1907); Johnson v. Samuels,
186 Ind. 56, 114 N. E. 977 (1917); Barr v. Sumner, 183 Ind. 402, 107 N. E.
675, 109 N. E. 193 (1915).
28. Herald v. Hardin, 95 Fla. 889, 116 So. 863 (1928); Carroll v. Fetty,
2 S. E. (2d) 521 (W. Va. 1939); Smith v. Commercial Bank, 77 Fla. 163, 81
So. 154 (1919); Randolph Co. v. Lewis, 196 N. C. 51, 144 S. E. 545 (1929).
29. O'Neall v. Farr, 1 Rich. 80 (S. C. 1844); Martin v. Martin, 267 Mass.
157, 166 N. E. 820 (1929); Keller v. Keller, 239 Pa. 467, 86 Atl. 1065 (1913) (ex-
cessive kindness, consideration, and attention may constitute undue influence.)
30. McCoy v. McMahon Const. Co., 216 S. W. 770 (Mo. 1919); Weiner v.
Minor, 197 Atl. 691 (Conn. 1938); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 492, Com-
ment g, § 493; 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1937) § 1606.
31. Though any member of the public may lawfully prosecute a known
criminal, a threat even of well founded prosecution is improper if made for the
purpose of private gain. Thompson v. Niggley, 53 Kan. 664, 35 Pac. 290 (1894);
Hartford Ins. Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 111 Ala. 456, 20 So. 651 (1896); Note (1926)
39 HARv. L. REv. 393. This was the situation in Galusha v. Sherman, 105 Wis.
263, 81 N. W. 495 (1900); Williamson, Halsell, Frazier Co. v. Ackerman, 77
Kan. 502, 94 Pac. 807 (1908); American Nat. Bank v. Helling, 161 Minn.
504, 202 N. W. 20 (1925).
32. Mississippi Valley Trust Co. v. Begley, 298 Mo. 684, 252 S. W. 76
(1923).
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means for the enforcement of their claims, and ordinarily it is not duress to
threaten to take these means.83 Thus, a debtor who paid a disputed claim for
an amount in excess of that actually due in order to avoid attachment of his
property could not recover the excess amount on the theory that it was paid
under duress, in the absence of a showing that the creditor acted in bad faith
in bringing his suit and ordering the officer to attach the property.84 But, if
the threat to use these lawful means is made with the consciousness that there
is no real right of action and the purpose is coercion, a payment or contract
induced thereby is voidable.35
In certain situations the threat to do a legal act or legally to refrain from
acting may be wrongful, so as to render the transaction invalid because of
duress, because the particular circumstance of the parties is such that they
are not on an equal financial footing, and one of them is subjected to a loss of his
entire capital investment or a substantial portion thereof. Here the wrongful
conduct of the duressor is not his abuse of a legal process, but the conduct is
wrongful because he has taken unfair and oppressive advantage of the duressee's
financial and business situation. The contract is more than a harsh contract. It
is a contract founded in extortion and oppression. These are the cases of so-called
"economic duress," or "business compulsion." 36  Thus in Harris v. Carij,3 7 the
plaintiff, the defendant, and others organized a corporation for the purpose
of buying mining land. The parties made an agreement by which the defendant
and the others were to advance the money needed, and were to receive in re-
turn a proportion of the capital stock of the corporation. The plaintiff was to
receive two-ninths of said capital stock in return for his services in locating
and buying the land. After the plaintiff had worked for three years and had
bought several hundred acres of land for the corporation, the defendant de-
manded that the plaintiff surrender to him one-half of his twvo-ninths interest
in the stock, and threatened that if the plaintiff did not do so he would not ad-
vance any more money, but would allow the corporation to be sold out so that
the plaintiff would then take nothing. The defendant at this time had three-
fourths of the stock, and the control of the corporation. The plaintiff had
little business experience, no money, a family to support, and was in debt. The
court found, "that while in this state of fear and financial and mental distress,
much against his will, he was forced to and did, for the purpose of having the
33. 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1937) § 1606.
34. Remington Arms Union Metallic Cartridge Co. v. Feeney Tool Co.,
97 Conn. 129, 115 Atl. 629 (1921).
35. White v. McCoy Land Co., 229 Mo. App. 1019, 87 S. W. (2d) 672 (1935);
Note (1936) 84 U. OF PA. L. Rnv. 659; Harper v. Murray, 184 Cal. 290, 193
Pac. 576 (1920).
36. National Enameling & Stamping Co. v. St. Louis, 328 Mo. 648, 40 S.
W. (2d) 593 (1931); Olympia Brewing Co. v. State, 102 Wash. 494, 173 Pac.
430 (1918); Sunset Copper Co. v. Black, 115 Wash. 132, 196 Pac. 640 (1921);
Johnson v. Townsend & Co., 161 Wash. 332, 296 Pac. 1046 (1931); Ferguson v.
Associated Oil Co., 173 Wash. 672, 24 P. (2d) 82 (1933); Pacific Mutual Life
Ins. Co. v. McCaskill, 170 So. 579 (Fla. 1936); Notes (1932) 79 A. L. R. 655,(1932) 7 WASH. L. REv. 248, (1934) 8 WASH. L. REV. 140.
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debts paid and thereby saving himself from financial ruin, make and execute
two agreements. .. ,3
It could hardly be said that it was illegal for the defendant to refuse to
advance any more money to the corporation. Yet, it was held that such refusal
for the purpose of forcing the plaintiff to execute these agreements was a wrong-
ful act, making the agreements invalid because procured by duress.
Likewise, in Ramp Buildings Corp. v. Northwest Building Co., 39 the defend-
ant was constructing a large commercial garage on money which he had borrowed
from E, the mortgagee. The plaintiff, who was the holder of certain patent
rights on garage construction, informed the defendant and E that the defendant
was infringing on his patent rights, and threatened to sue the defendant and
E for such infringement unless the defendant agreed to pay $3000 for a license to
use the patents. Because of the plaintiff's threat, E refused to advance any
more money to the defendant, who had no money himself with which to complete
the garage. The defendant signed the license agreement and paid $1000 down.
In a suit by the plaintiff for the $2000 balance the defendant demurred to the
complaint, setting out the facts above, and also alleging that the patents were
invalid. In the lower court the demurrer was overruled and the plaintiff ob-
tained judgment, but in the higher court the demurrer was sustained and the
case remanded for new trial, the court recognizing the modern doctrine of
"business compulsion." The defendant obviously had executed the agreement
under duress, since he had a chance of losing his whole investment.
40
It may not be inaccurate to say that the acts and interests involved in
duress are unquestionably being enlarged rather than restricted. In the recent
case of Carroll v. Fetty,41 the court seems to recognize what may be called
a doctrine of "moral duress," in which the duressor's threat is to cause undue
humiliation to the duressee, or to unduly lacerate his feelings, as distinguished
from "economic duress" in which the threat is to injure the duressee's business
or investments. In this case, the plaintiff's six year old child was killed by the
negligence of the defendant. The undertaker refused to release the body of
the child to the plaintiff for burial until he had been paid for his services. The
defendant, knowing this, gave the plaintiff $800 for a full release of the plaintiff's
claim against him. The plaintiff brought an action against the defendant for
the wrongful death, to which the defendant pleaded the release. The court
set aside the release on the ground of duress, indicating in its opinion that any
indication of unconscionable conduct or overreaching by a party would be
treated as wrongful compulsion.
This liberal attitude of the courts in construing oppression and overreaching
by the duressor (which are acts wrongful in a moral sense as distinguished from
38. Id at 367, 71 S. E. at 553.
39. 164 Wash. 603, 4 P. (2d) 507 (1931). See also annotation on "business
compulsion" with the report of this case in (1932) 79 A. L. R. 651.
40. Abuse of process was not involved in this case for it does not appear
that plaintiff's threat to sue was made in bad faith.
41. 2 S. E. (2d) 521 (W. Va. 1939).
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criminal or tortious acts) as acts sufficiently wrongful to constitute duress, 42
is in keeping with the growing policy of the law to protect the individual from
injuries to his sensibilities. 43 Yet, however liberal a court may be in finding the
acts of the duressor wrongful, to constitute duress the acts must be wrongful. 44
It is not enough that the will of the complaining party was coerced. His will
must have been coerced by a "wrongful" act. It is clear, however, that the
term "wrongful" is the subject of constant re-examination and re-interpretation
and, as these cases show, is far from static in content.
Duress, then, is not merely a matter of the coercion of the will of the wronged
party, nor is it merely a matter of wrongful conduct by the duressor. It is
a double concept involving wrongful conduct by one, the effect of which is to
destroy the free agency of the other.
LYNDON STURGIS
HOMESTEAD-EFFECT OF REMARRIAGE BY WIDOW
The examination of any problem concerning homestead must of necessity
begin with a consideration of the nature of this right.1 Homestead is entirely
a statutory and constitutional creature and has no common law counterpart.2
Its purpose is to secure to the family a home, regardless of financial condition,
and thus provide a shelter beyond reach of creditors; it does not rest in any
way upon equitable principles but is purely a policy peculiar to the democratic
state.3
In Missouri, as in most states, there are two distinct types of homestead
rights.4 One is the exemption from claims of creditors created in the head of
the houses (with which we are not concerned in this comment). The other is
the homestead right descending to the widow and minor children upon the death
of the head of the house.6
Two theories are advanced by the courts with reference to the nature of
42. This position is taken in the RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 492,
Comment g, § 493, illustrations of Clause (e).
43. Pound, Interests of Personality (1915) 28 HARV. L. REv. 343; HARPER,
TORTS (1933) § 268 (interest in freedom from unjustifiable litigation), § 277(right to privacy); Brandies and Warren, The Right to Privacy (1890) 4
HARv. L. REv., 193.
44. See note 30, supra.
1. For a discussion of this right in Missouri see Dennis v. Gorman, 289
Mo. 1, 233 S. W. 50 (1921); (1914) 3 U. OF Mo. BULL. L. SER. 33.
2. Adams v. Adams, 183 Mo. 396, 82 S. W. 66 (1904); Dennis v. Gorman,
289 Mo. 1, 233 S. W. 50 (1921); 1 WOERNER, AMERICAN LAW OF ADMINISTRATION
(3rd ed. 1923) § 94.
3. See Balance v. Gordon, 247 Mo. 119, 124, 152 S. W. 358, 359 (1912);(1916) 13 R. C. L. "Homestead" §§ 1, 2, and 5; Vance, Homestead Esemption
Laws (1932) 7 ENCY. OF Soc. Sci. 441.
4. Hufschmidt v. Gross, 112 Mo. 649, 20 S. W. 679 (1892).
5. Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § 608.
6. Id. § 612.
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both types of homestead rights. One is that these rights are exemptions-mere
privileges of enjoyment of the property free of claims of creditors; the other,
that they are estates in land.7 With a few exceptions the Missouri courts have
followed the latter view as regards the homestead right created in the widow
and minor children. 8
Even more consistent have been the Missouri courts in adherence to the
rule of all jurisdictions that the law applicable is the one in force at the death
of the head of the house.9
The first homestead law in Missouri was enacted in 1863,10 and probably
established only a period of exemption; but the next act in 1865, 1 as construed
by the courts, created a fee in the widow subject only to a right of joint occu-
pancy in the minor children, if any, during minority.' 2 Thus, the effect was
to take the homestead tract from under the operation of the general statutes of
descent so that it descended to the heirs of the widow, upon her death, rather
than to the heirs of the husband.13
To alter this interpretation an act amending this statute was passed in
1875,14 which limited the widow's interest to her life, and further provided
that, ". . all the right, title and interest of the deceased . . . head of a
family . . ., except the estate of the homestead thus continued, shall be
subject to the laws relating to devise, descent, dower, partition and sale for the
payment of debts against the estate of the deceased. . ." Aftek one case,' 5
subsequently overruled, had held the widow had merely a right of occupancy
under this statute, the courts uniformly adhered to the view that she had an
estate for life, the minor children an estate for years until attainment of ma-
7. (1916) 13 R. C. L. "Homestead" § 3.
8. 1 WOERNER, op. cit. supra note 2, § 94, n. 3.
9. Register v. Hensley, 70 Mo. 189 (1879); Davidson v. Davis, 86 Mo.
440 (1885); Burgess v. Bowles, 99 Mo. 543, 12 S. W. 341 (1889); Linville v.
Hartley, 130 Mo. 252, 32 S. W. 652 (1895); Brewington v. Brewington, 211 Mo.
48, 109 S. W. 723 (1908); Bushnell v. Loomis, 234 Mo. 371, 137 S. W. 257
(1911); Balance v. Gordon, 247 Mo. 119, 152 S. W. 358 (1912); (1890) 6 L.
R. A. 814; (1916) 13 R. C. L. "Homestead" § 121.
10. Mo. Laws 1862-63, p. 21.
11. Mo. GE.N. STAT. (1866), c. 111, § 5.
12. Skouten v. Wood, 57 Mo. 380 (1874); Rogers v. Marsh, 73 Mo. 64
(1880); (1914) 3 U. OF Mo. BU=L. L. Sam 33.
13. Skouten v. Wood, 57 Mo. 380 (1874).
14. Mo. Laws 1875, p. 60, § 1.
15. Kaes v. Gross, 92 Mo. 647, 3 S. W. 840 (1887). That the difference
in the two theories is fundamental and would result in far different solutions
to the present problem and related ones is best illustrated by the assumptions
of the court, nearly all of which have been decided oppositely, subsequently, under
the estate theory: ". . . inasmuch as, in regard to a homestead, a widow,
with a family, as in this case, cannot alienate the homestead; inasmuch as,
between herself and her children, it is indivisible, and must so remain till the
youngest child becomes of age; inasmuch as such homestead is not subject to
the laws relating to devises; inasmuch as a widow, thus circumstanced, could not,
if she would, by joining with her second husband, convey the homestead away;
." Id. at 657, 3 S. W. 843. Quaere: Would not the two theories also
reach different results as regards problems of taxation, waste, or replevin of
personalty severed from the land? What effect on the problem of sale of
the reversion subject to the homestead raised in Poland v. Vesper, 67 Mo.
727 (1878); Broyles v. Cox, 153 Mo. 242, 54 S. W. 488 (1899)?
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jority, and the heirs of the deceased husband a remainder16 in fee, so that the
land no longer passed to the heirs of the widow upon her death. 17 The courts
were so imbued with the estate theory that they, seemingly overlooking the
purpose of the statute,1 8 even went so far as to hold that the widow and minor
children did not lose the homestead right by removal from the land,1 nor
where the widow remarried and gained a new home.20
It was apparently to correct this construction of the statute that the legisla-
ture in 1895 amended the act of 1875 by striking out the above quoted words,
which had resubjected the homestead site to the laws of descent, sale for
payment of debts, etc., and inserting in their place, "that is to say, the children
shall have the joint right of occupation with the widow, until they shall arrive
respectively at their majority, and the widow shall have the right to occupy such
homestead during her life or widowhood, and upon her death or remarriage it
shall pass to the heirs of the husband; . . ",21
For the purpose of comparison the
set out:
"If any such housekeeper or head
of a family shall die leaving a widow
or any minor children, his homestead
to the value aforesaid shall pass to
and vest in such widow or children, or
if there be both, to such widow and
children, and shall continue for their
benefit without being subject to the
payment of the debts of the deceased,
unless legally charged thereon in his
lifetime, until the youngest child shall
attain its legal majority, and until
the death of such widow, and such
homestead shall, upon the death of
such housekeeper or head of a fam-
ily, be limited to that period. But
all the right, title and interest of
statutes of 1875 and 1895 are herein
"If any such housekeeper or head
of a family shall die, leaving a widow
or any minor children, his homestead
to the value aforesaid shall pass to
and vest in such widow or children,
or if there be both, to such widow and
children, and shall continue for their
benefit without being subject to the
payment of the debts of the deceased,
unless legally charged thereon in his
lifetime, until the youngest child shall
attain its legal majority, and until
the death of such widow: that is to
say, the children, shall have the joint
right of occupation with the widow
until they shall arrive respectively
at their majority, and the widow shall
16. The Missouri courts have consistently called this a "remainder in fee in
the heirs," but it would seem to really be a reversion in the deceased husband
which is not created in the heirs by virtue of the statute or by purchase under
a will as would be true in case of a remainder, but passes to his heirs by de-
scent. (1916) 13 R. C. L. "Homestead" § 137, p. 678; (1902) 56 L. R. A. 421.
17. Hufschmidt v. Gross, 112 Mo. 649, 20 S. W. 679 (1892); Wilson v.
Johnson, 160 Mo. 507, 61 S. W. 189 (1901); West v. McMullen, 112 Mo. 405,
20 S. W. 628 (1892); Schowe v. Kallmeyer, 323 Mo. 899, 20 S. W. (2d) 26(1929).
18. 1WoERNER, op cit. supra note 2, § 94, n. 3.
19. Hufschmidt v. Gross, 112 Mo. 649, 20 S. W. 679 (1892) (presumably
if an exemption, it would have suspended or destroyed the right of occupancy).
20. West v. McMullen, 112 Mo. 405, 20 S. W. 628 (1892) ; Ailey v. Burnett,
134 Mo. 313, 33 S. W. 1122 (1896).
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the deceased housekeeper or head of
a family in the premises, except the
estate of the homestead thus con-
tinued, shall be subject to the laws
relating to devise, descent, dower,
participation and sale for the pay-
ment of debts against the estate of
the deceased, and the probate court
having jurisdiction of the estate of
the deceased housekeeper or head of
a family shall, when necessary, ap-
point three commissioners to set out
such homestead to the person or per-
sons entitled thereto."22
have the right to occupy such home-
stead during her life or widowhood,
and upon her death or remarriage
it shall pc'ss to the heirs of the hus-
band; and the probate court having
jurisdiction of the estate of the de-
ceased housekeeper, or head of a
family, shall, when necessary, ap-
point three commissioners to set out
such homestead to the person or per-
sons entitled thereto."23  (Italics
mine.)
It will be noted that this new statute re-emphasizes the right of occupancy
thus tending to restrict the homestead right to the exemption theory.24 How-
ever, this was not the view adopted by the courts, which continued to adhere
to the estate concept 25 in Brewington v. Brewington, 6 apparently failing to recog-
nize that the amendment of 1895 could possibly have been intended to do more
than add the condition of widowhood to the widow's homestead right.2 7
It seems, then, that the clause set forth in italics above in the statute of
1895 was intended to retain the purpose of the amendment of 1875: 'Viz., to
insure descent of the tract to the heirs of the husband instead of the wife, as
previously pointed out. Although no record of the debates upon acts before the
legislature is kept, still by following the act of 1895 through the legislature 2S
it will be noted that the amended act was originally introduced in and passed
by the house of representatives in its final form except for the words, "or re-
marriage," which were inserted only later by the senate. A close comparison of
the two statutes will demonstrate the significance of this fact.
22. Mo. Laws 1875, p. 60; re-enacted Mo. REv. STAT. (1879) § 2693.
23. Mo. Laws 1895, p. 185, 186; re-enacted Mo. RnV. STAT. (1899) § 3620.
24. 1 WOERNER, op. cit. supra note 2, § 94, n. 3.
25. First intimated in Gorman v. Hale, 109 Mo. App. 176, 82 S. W. 1110
(1904), but not shown which act was applied.
26. 211 Mo. 48, 109 S. W. 723 (1908).
27. Although the court purportedly examined the statute in its amended
form after 1895, it flatly stated as settled law that "a life estate (determinable,
as the statute now stands, on the remarriage of the widow) vests, . . . in
his widow; and an estate for years (determinable as to each minor when he
reached his legal majority) vests in his minor children," but cited in support
four cases, all of which had been decided under the statute of 1875: Elstroth
v. Young, 83 Mo. App. 253 (1900) (decided under the act of 1875, although the
act of 1895 should have been applied); Hufschmidt v. Gross, 112 Mo. 649, 20
S. W. 679 (1892) ; West v. McMullen, 112 Mo. 405, 20 S. W. 628 (1892) ; Wilson
v. Johnson, 160 Mo. 507, 61 S. W. 189 (1901). This view was subsequently
clearly affirmed in McMichaels v. Reece, 194 Mo. App. 363, 190 S. W. 51 (1916).
28. House Bill # 124, 38 House Journal, pp. 36, 86, 129, 182, 244, 354,
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It will be noted that the part struck from the statute was that which was
inserted by the amendment of 1875 placing the tract under the laws of descent
after the termination of the homestead by the death of the widow and the chil-
dren's attaining majority. It is also apparent that the wording of that amend-
ment was none too clear. Now in comparison with the act of 1895, it appears
that the only wording in the latter act which refers to descent at all is the
clause, "it shall pass to the heirs of the husband." In view of the intent of
the legislature as shown by the amendment of 1875, it would seem that this
clause was a substitute for the wordy clause stricken from the statute by
the act of 1895. Especially is this true in view of the fact that the words,
"or remarriage," were not in the act of 1895 as originally introduced. These
words were later inserted by the senate as further limitations upon the widow's
interest to correct the judicial constructions previously cited and had no reference
to the clause in question which immediately followed. It seems the legislature
intended that the word "it" in this clause refer to the reversionary interest in
the husband and did not intend that it should modify only the preceding clause
"upon her death or remarriage," but the entire sentence. That is, "it" had ref-
erence to the homestead mentioned in the first clause of the statute.
Thus stood the law when the supreme court decided the case of Smith Bros.
Land & Investment Co. v. Phillips.29 In this case, the widow had assigned her
homestead and dower rights to the plaintiff and with the minor children aban-
doned the land. Shortly thereafter, as guardian for the minor children, the
widow established that their homestead right was still existent in an action of
ejectment3O against the grantees and regained possession which she and one
of the children retained until the action of the principal case was brought.
Shortly after regaining possession the widow had remarried and admittedly ex-
tinguished her right of homestead in the assignees, the plaintiffs. The plain-
tiffs brought an action of ejectment, after attainment of majority by all the
children, against the widow and the son still living on the land, claiming a
right of possession through the widow's right of dower. The son pleaded the
special statute of limitations as to proceedings for assignment of dower. The
court held that the right to have dower admeasured had arisen upon the widow's
remarriageil fourteen years prior to commencement of this action, and there-
fore the plaintiff was barred from his right as assignee to dower and quarantine.
The court also stated that the entire homestead estate ceased upon the widow's
remarriage and that thereafter the children were in possession by right of in-
heritance from their father.32
29. 289 Mo. 579, 233 S. W. 413 (1921).
30. Phillips v. Presson, 172 Mo. 24, 72 S. W. 501 (1903).31. This had already been determined in Jordan v. Rudiuff, 264 Mo. 129,
174 S. W. 806 (1915).
32. Smith Bros. Land & Inv. Co. v. Phillips, 289 Mo. 579, 233 S. W. 413(1921) (this conclusion was reached by the court's seizing upon the clause in
the statute set forth in italics above and giving it too literal a construction
without consideration in light of the rest of the statute; thus the purpose of this
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Since the children had all attained majority, this case can hardly be said
to be more than strong dictum for this conclusion. The importance of this
case, however, lies in the fact that the court examined the act of 1895 at great
length and asserted that the reason for that amendment was to prevent the last
minor child's having sole possession of the homestead if predeceased by the
widow or in the event of her remarriage, in which events his guardian would
be the head of the family consisting of only the minor children. 33
The court failed even to mention the Brewington case, nor was the con-
struction of the acts of 1865 and 1875 considered. While the court used the
language of the estate theory, it is difficult to see how an estate for years in
the children during minority could be terminated by an act of the widow, unless
it be said that the statute created an estate for years subject to defeasance by
the death or remarriage of the widow. This latter construction had never been
suggested prior to this case and it is hard to reconcile with the language of the
statute.
Only five years later the supreme court in Moore v. Mansfield,34 reaffirmed
the dictum in the Brewington case, to the effect that the widow had a deter-
minable life estate and the children each a determinable estate for years; 35
and while this would seem to overrule the dictum, that all the children, both
adult and minor, took a fee upon remarriage of the widow,36 set forth in the
Phillips case, this latter case was unexplainably not mentioned by the court,
which seems to have overlooked it entirely.
Moore v. Mansfield was an action to quiet title, have dower admeasured,
and recover rents and profits. The husband, owner of the land, died leaving a
wife and minor child (his only child), who was the plaintiff in this action.
The widow remarried and then quit-claimed her interest to third parties, who
went into possession and retained possession up to the commencement of this
action. Plaintiff asked that title be decreed to be in him subject to the widow's
dower interest which the assignees now owned. The trial court dismissed the
count for rents and profits but otherwise found for the plaintiff. The supreme
court held that the count for rents and profits should not have been dismissed,
saying that plaintiff had had a homestead estate in the land which was not
terminated by the widow's remarriage.37 The court again used the language
employed in the Brewington case38 clearly denoting adherence to the estate
theory, and relied mainly upon that case and the cases cited therein for this
position.30  Thus, again, the construction of the statute of 1875 was followed
33. Id. at 589, 233 S. W. at 416.
34. 286 S. W. 353 (Mo. 1926).
35. See note 27, supra.
36. See notes 32 and 33, supra.
37. It was already established that the party entitled to possession of a
homestead is entitled to the rents and profits. Ailey v. Burnett, 134 Mo. 313, 33
S. W. 1122 (1896).
38. Brewington v. Brewington, 211 Mo. 48, 56, 109 S. W. 723, 726 (1908).
39. In addition two other cases were also cited: Gorman v. Hale, 109
Mo. App. 176, 82 S. W. 1110 (1904); McMichaels v. Reece, 194 Mo. App. 363,
190 S. W. 51 (1916).
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without critical examination of the act of 1895, through subservience to the
dicta of the previous cases. This dicta, as previously pointed out, will not
withstand a close analysis.40 Nor can this case be rationalized on the grounds
that rents and profits could have been recovered in an action of ejectment by
the son as being the owner in fee from the time of the widow's remarriage and
thus reconciled with the Phillips case, for such damages are expressly limited by
statute to the five years preceding the commencement of the action; 4' while in
the Mansfield case, the court allowed such damages for a period of approximately
fourteen years.
The statute was amended to its present form in 1907,42 defining majority
to be twenty-one years of age, authorizing the sale of the homestead for deced-
ent's debts where his heirs were other than his children, but in no way elim-
inating the problem of construction here presented, although one case by dictum
seemingly assumes that under this statute the minor children's homestead in-
terest would continue until the youngest child reached twenty-one.48
In another case, Maupin v. Longacre,44 the supreme court decreed title to
be in a minor child from the time of the widow's remarriage and ordered an ac-
counting from that date, but no mention was made of the problem of statutory
construction involved, the court seemingly assuming that the minor child could
claim title in fee as the only heir, although the widow had originally claimed a
homestead right.45
It is submitted that, while the proper results may have been reached in
the Phillips and Mansfield cases, neither case was correct in its analysis of the
statute of 1895; that the legislature intended not to give an estate to the widow
and minors, but to preserve an exemption for the benefit of the family, the con-
ditions to enjoyment of which attached only to the individual's personal right
and not to the duration of the homestead itself; 46 that is, it was not intended
that the attainment of majority by the minors or the widow's death or remar-
riage should affect any but his or her personal right to enjoy the homestead.
This is best proved by the fact that the courts in determining the value of
the widow's homestead right for comparison with the value of her dower right,
under the statute relating to admeasurement of homestead and dower, 47 subtract
the value of the minor children's homestead right.48 This latter is calculated
40. See note 27, supra.
41. Mo. RLv. STAT. (1899) § 3065; re-enacted in Mo. REv. STAT. (1919) §
1827.
42. Mo. Laws 1907, p. 301. Apparently the amendment was intended to
solve the problem of sale of the land subject to the homestead rights. (1914)
3 U. or Mo. BuLL. L. SER. 33, n. 33, p. 38.
43. Dennis v. Gorman, 289 Mo. 1, 233 S. W. 50 (1921) (this case preceded
the Philips case by a month and thus was not confronted with the conflict of the
Phillips and Mansfield cases).
44. 315 Mo. 872, 288 S. W. 54 (1926).
45. This result can be explained on the grounds of merger, since the plain-
tiff was the only child and heir.
46. (1914) 3 U. OF Mo. BULL. L. SER. 36.
47. MO. REv. STAT. (1929) § 614 (in force since 1865).
48. Jordan v. Rudluff, 264 Mo. 129, 174 S. W. 806 (1915) (cited with
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solely upon the length of time necessary for each child to attain majority and
the possibility of earlier termination of the children's interests by remarriage of
the widow is not considered.
It would seem, however, that if the Missouri courts are going to continue
with the estate rather than the exemption theory, the position of the Mansfield case
and others cited therein-that remarriage of the widow before the attainment
of majority by all the children will not terminate the homestead estate, but give
the minors sole possession until attaining majority is the better view, the one
more compatible with the language of the statute in view of its history, the
one best calculated to effectuate the purpose of the homestead right, and the
one most likely to be adopted by the supreme court in the future; at least,
it certainly represents what might be called the weight of the Missouri cases.
CHARLES G. YOUNG
P RTITION IN MISSOURI
The development of the law of partition, like other fields of law, has de-
pended upon social and economic conditions and necessities. At early common
law in England the ideas of tenure and primogeniture were uppermost and
there was little room for the operation of partition. Only co-heiresses, called
co-parceners, could compel partition by use of the writ de partitione facienda.1
Additional forms of co-ownership were evolved at common law to which com-
pulsory partition was not an incident. It was said that tenants by the entireties,
tenants in common, and joint tenants might "make partition between them,
and the partition is good enough; but they shall not be compelled to do this by
the law."2  Blackstone gave, as the reason for this rule, the fact that these
estates were created by the act of the parties and any hardship arising out of the
co-ownership was a result of their voluntary acts. 6
In the light of changing social and economic factors it became apparent
that co-ownership was often unsatisfactory and a burden, and that compulsory
partition was needed. This need was recognized in England by the statute of
Henry VIII,4 giving to joint tenants and tenants in common of estates of in-
heritance the right to a compulsory division. But this partition was that of
1. 2 Co. LITT. *241.
2. Id. §§ 290, 318. Early in the history of Roman law co-owners could
enforce a division of the common property if the land admitted of easy division.
If the subject of partition could not be easily divided, then the whole was given
to one of the co-owners who compensated the others. The property was awarded
to the highest bidder, and even a stranger might bid at the request of a co-
owner who was unwilling, or unable, to bid for himself. These principles were
accepted in Anglo-Saxon law only after a long and bitter struggle with feudal
custom and practice. Note (1919) 67 U. OF PA. L. REv. 162, 164.
3. 2 BL. COiMI. *185; FREEMAN, COTENANCY AND PARTITION (2d ed. 1886)
§ 421.
4. 31 HEN. VIII (1539); Note, FREEMAN, op. cit. supra note 3, § 421.
38
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purely physical division and was often inadequate, even after the courts of
Chancery assumed jurisdiction of partition.5 This remedy of partition in kind
was long conceded to be too technical, dilatory and inadequate, and in the Par-
tition Act of 18686 it was declared that the court must order a sale at the
request of the owners of a moiety in the property unless good reason was shown
to the contrary; and the court may, in its discretion, order a sale at the request
of any owner, if it appears that it will be beneficial by reason of the nature
of the property, the number or disability of the parties, or other circumstances.
Thus for the first time in England there was division, or partition, by means of
sale.7
In the United States the law of partition is statutory, and the laws of the
states vary greatly. However, all bear a certain resemblance to the English
system. The inconvenience and annoyance of the lack of power to force par-
tition by sale was more quickly felt in the United States than in England.
And it was early recognized that public welfare, as well as personal gain, neces-
sitated some adequate means of allowing co-owners to sever their joint or com-
mon interests.8
Before proceeding to a consideration of what interests may be divided by
means of compulsory partition, it should be made clear that the essential condi-
tion precedent to a division by means of partition is that the land be held in
cotenancy. Without cotenancy there can be no compulsory partition. This
stems from the primary reason for the statutes of partition, viz., to remove the
difficulties, discomforts and injuries resulting from the common possession in
cotenancies. It is essential that the plaintiff have title to an undivided interest
in the lands which he seeks to have partitioned, 9 and the defendant's interest
must also be an undivided one, rather than in severalty.10 It should be noted
in this connection that several persons may together own an entire thing with-
out being cotenants thereof," and in such case they are no more entitled to
partition than if they werd the owners of separate pieces of property.12
A widow with dower consummate cannot maintain an action for partition.13
She has a right to force the heirs to set aside the prescribed portion for her
use for life. She has no estate in the land before dower is assigned, so there
is no cotenancy at that time. After dower is assigned she has an estate for
5. Turner v. Morgan, 8 Ves. 143 (Ch. 1803); North v. Guinan, Beatty 342
(1829).
6. 31 & 32 VIcT. c. 40 (1867-8).
7. For a more extensive history of partition see FREEMAN, op. cit. supra
note 3, c. 19.
8. Mo. REv. STAT. (1825) p. 609; 4 KENT'S COMM. *364.
9. Arnett v. Bailey, 60 Ala. 435 (1877).
10. Russell v. Beasley, 72 Ala. 190 (1882).
11. FREEMAN, op. cit. supra note 3, § 87. The owner in fee simple abso-
lute may convey the coal rights to one, the sand and gravel rights to another,
etc. All of these "co-owners" would own in severalty, and no one of them could
maintain an action of partition against the others.
12. McConnel v. Kibbe, 43 Ill. 12 (1867).
13. White v. Summerville, 283 Mo. 268, 223 S. W. 101 (1920); FREEMAN,
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life in severalty, followed by a remainder in the heirs or devisees, and she is
neither "tenant in common, joint tenant nor coparcener with the fee owners.' 14
After the assignment of the widow's dower, the remaining two-thirds interest
in fee may be partitioned in kind or sold, if owned by several heirs or devisees,
and the remainder as to the one-third set aside may be partitioned in kind, or
sold, subject to the life estate of the widow.' 5 The homestead, with respect to
partition, is similar to dower and it may not be included in partition, but after
being set aside, the balance may be partitioned by the heirs or devisees. 16
The problem is to determine when the owner of a present possessory interest
in land, or of a present right to a future possession in land, ordinarily called
a future interest, may bring an action to sever his interest from those of his
co-owners. Under this problem are six basic fact situations which must be
examined in qonnection with the Missouri statutes on partition.17 A more
complex case consists simply of the same basic types involving a greater number
of parties, or of a combination of two or more of these basic types.
1. A and B own undivided present interests in fee simple absolute
There is little need for a discussion of this usual and most simple case for
partition. A and B, both owning an undivided interest in fee and thus being
in possession, or entitled to possession, may have partition in kind, or where
such is impractical may force a sale of the land with division of the proceeds in
proportion to the respective sizes of their shares.'8 The fact that there are
executory limitations over as to some of the shares does not bar partition, 9
14. White v. Summerville, 283 Mo. 268, 223 S. W. 101 (1920).
15. Duncan v. Dunan, 324 Mo. 167, 23 S. W. (2d) 91 (1929).
16. Dalton v. Simpson, 270 Mo. 287, 193 S. W. 546 (1917); Hammons v.
Hammons, 300 Mo. 144, 253 S. W. 1053 (1923).
17. Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § 1545; first enacted in its present form in Mo.'
Rnv. STAT. (1865) p. 611. "In all cases where lands, tenements or hereditaments
are held in joint tenancy, tenancy in common, or co-parcenary, including estates
in fee, for life, or for years, tenancy by the curtesy and in dower," any person
interested may ask "for the admeasurement and setting off of any dower in-
terest therein, if any, and for the partition of the remainder, if the same can be
done without great prejudice to the parties in interest; and if not, then for a
sale of the premises, and a division of the proceeds thereof among all of the
parties, according to their respective rights and interests."
18. Young v. Young, 307 Mo. 218, 270 S. W. 653 (1925); Contaldi v. Erri-
chetti, 79 Conn. 273, 64 Atl. 211 (1906); Kinkead v. Maxwell, 75 Kan. 50, 88
Pac. 523 (1907); Ericson v. Martin, 144 Ky. 289, 138 S. W. 262 (1911); De-
shong v. Deshong, 186 Pa. 227, 40 Atl. 402 (1898).
19. Buckner v. Buckner, 210 S. W. 887 (Mo. 1919). It was there said:
children born in lawful wedlock . . . their heirs and assigns, are
owners as tenants in common of the land described in the petition, the undivided
whole of their title being subject to possible diminution by the birth of another
such child or other children (of the class). Their possessory right to the
entire tract as tenants in common is perfect and complete." ". . . all the
present owners of the fee jointly stand with respect to their titles in the
position of trustees" as to those persons who may later come into existence and
take an interest by way of executory devise. "Those not in being were sup-
posed to be represented by those upon whose title their expectancy was founded.
This principle has been recognized and acted upon by the English courts for
more than 100 years (Wills v. Slade, 6 Ves. Ch. 498; Gaskell v. Gaskell, 6 Sim.
Ch. 643), and was followed and recognized in our own statute. R. S. 1909, §§
2561-2564." Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § 1547, provides that an unborn person may
1941] OMENTS
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if the partition in kind is made subject to the executory interests, or, in case of
sale, the executory interest is transferred from the land to the proceeds of the
sale. The proceeds may be used to create a trust fund, or they may be invested
in bonds, etc., the income to be given to the owners of the fee until such time
as the executory interest becomes an estate in possession or entitled to posses-
sion. Or the proceeds may be given to the owners of the fee upon their giving
bond to deliver the corpus to the holder of the executory interest upon the estate
becoming one entitled to possession.
2. A has a life estate, and B has a vested remainder, in the whole
By the great weight of authority a life tenant of the entire estate may not
have partition against the owner of the remainder.20 "The only estates author-
ized by Section 2559, Revised Statutes 1909" (Mo. Rev. Stat. (1929) § 1545.)
"to be partitioned are estates which are coterminous and not successive; co-
tenants of a life estate may have partition of their life estate which would not
affect the remainder; or, remaindermen, tenants in common, may have a par-
tition of the remainder subject to the life estate. But there is no authority for
a partition between the life tenant and a remainderman.21 Such a decision is
not surprising, since the power to partition was brought into existence to avoid
the hardships and inconveniences of common or joint possession. Here the parties
having only successive interests are not generally under any inconvenience. It
may be that a life tenant would prefer to own a smaller portion in fee. But is
that a valid ground for granting him the power of partition? In the light of
the language of the usual partition statute and the original purpose of them
the answer would seem to be "no." If the life tenant purchased his life estate
voluntarily he certainly should not be heard to complain. And if it came to
him as a gift his position is little better. If the donor wished to create such
estates the object of his beneficence should be bound by that intention.22 A
be bound by a decree in partition when he is represented by (1) a person of
equal interest, or (2) by a guardian ad litem. Accord: Pitzer v. Morrison,
272 Ill. 291, 111 N. E. 1017 (1916).
20. Stockwell v. Stockwell, 262 Mo. 671, 172 S. W. 23 (1914); Gibson v.Gibson, 280 Mo. 519, 219 S. W. 561 (1920), here, however, the court relied
heavily on Mo. REv. STAT. (1909) § 2569 (now Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § 1557)
which provides: "No partition or sale of lands, tenements or hereditaments,
devised by any last will, shall be made under the provisions of this article,
contrary to the intention of the testator, expressed in any such will": Carson
v. Hecke, 282 Mo. 580, 222 S. W. 850 (1920); Gray v. Clement, 286 Mo. 100,
227 S. W. 111 (1920); Cobb v. Frink, 200 Ala. 191, 75 So. 939 (1917); Krieg
v. Crawford, 59 Cal. App. 309, 210 Pac. 636 (1922); Smith v. Runnels, 97 Iowa
55, 65 N. W. 1002 (1896); Love v. Blauw, 61 Kan. 496, 59 Pac. 1059 (1900);
Roche v. Waters, 72 Md. 264, 19 At. 535 (1890); Wood v. Bryant, 68 Miss.
198, 8 So. 518 (1890) ; Soules v. Silver, 118 Ore. 96, 245 Pac. 1069 (1926); Sei-
ders v. Giles, 141 Pa. 93, 21 Atl. 514 (1891); Newell v. Willmarth, 30 R. I. 529,
76 Atl. 433 (1910); Jordan v. Jordan, 145 Tenn. 378, 239 S. W. 423 (1921).
21. Gray v. Clement, 286 Mo. 100, 107, 227 S. W. 111, 112 (1920).
22. Mo. REV. STAT. (1929) § 1557, expressly provides that there can be
no partition of lands, devised by will, contrary to the intention of the testator,
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partition decree at the instance of the life tenant does not divest the interest
of the remainderman, and it is open to collateral attack. 23
A fortiori the converse of the above is true, and the remainderman cannot
institute proceedings against the life tenant.24
Not infrequently land is located next to a pest house, or is a residence in a
smoky, noisy industrial district, etc., and thus produces meager rent and is
incapable of beneficial use. In such a situation the life tenant may fail to realize
any benefit from his interest in the land; there is injury to society at large by
reason of the reduction in the amount of marketable land; and if the income
and profit from the land are not sufficient to pay the taxes and necessary re-
pairs, it is possible that the interests of all persons, both life tenant and re-
mainderman, will be destroyed. In order to remedy such a situation Missouri
passed a statute authorizing judicial sale of the property at the instance of the
person having the possessory interest. "Any person or persons holding the
estate or an interest in the estate, carrying the right of immediate use and
enjoyment of such lands" may sue in equity for sale of the land upon the ground
that the "life or other estate" of immediate enjoyment is burdensome and un-
profitable and the rents and profits therefrom are not sufficient for taxes, repairs,
etc., and that a greater income can be had from sale of the land and invest-
ment of the proceeds in United States, Missouri, municipal or school bonds. The
statute expressly provides that the suit can be only at the instance of the per-
son who is in possession or entitled to immediate possession,2 5 and that such
action can be maintained against a vested or contingent remainderman, or a
person holding an executory interest "to commence or to vest in the future,
either absolute, contingent or conditional." 2  This statute requires very little
explanation, since the remedy it supplies is so specifically stated and bounded.
3. A has an undivided one half in fee, B has an undivided one half for life,
and C has an undivided one half in remainder
There is cotenancy as to the present possession between A and B, and
clearly either A or B may partition subject to C's remainder.27 Such a result
23. Gray v. Clement, 286 Mo. 100, 227 S. W. 111 (1920); Stansbury v.
Inglehart, 9 Mackey 134 (D. Col. 1891); Love v. Blauw, 61 Kan. 496, 59 Pac.
1059 (1900); Roche v. Waters, 72 Md. 264, 19 Atl. 535 (1890); Chickamauga
Trust Co. v. Lonas, 139 Tenn. 228, 201 S. W. 777 (1917).
24. Carson v. Hecke, 282 Mo. 580, 222 S. W. 850 (1920); VanEvery v.
McKay, 331 Mo. 355, 53 S. W. (2d) 873 (1932); Fies v. Rosser, 162 Ala. 504,
50 So. 287 (1909); Moore v. Shannon, 6 Mackey 157 (D. Col. 1887); Clark v.
Richardson, 32 Iowa 399 (1871); Stout v. Dunning, 72 Ind. 343 (1880); Heintz
v. Wilhelm, 151 Minn. 195, 186 N. W. 305 (1922); Weddingfeld v. Weddingfeld,
109 Neb. 729, 192 N. W. 227 (1923).
25. Duncan v. Duncan, 324 Mo. 167, 23 S. W. (2d) 91 (1929).
26. Mo. REV. STAT. (1929) § 1546. See Gavin v. Curtin, 171 Ill. 640, 49
N. E. 523 (1898); Bofil v. Fisher, 3 Rich. Eq. 1 (S. C. 1850), reaching the
same result, under circumstances like those provided for in the Missouri statute,
without benefit of a statute.
27. Carson v. Hecke, 282 Mo. 580, 222 S. W. 850 (1920); Gray v. Clement,
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logically follows from the same arguments that support partition between owners
of undivided interests in fee. Between A and C there is potential cotenancy as to
the remainder, and Missouri allows partition of the "remainders" subject to the
life estate at the instance of either A or C.28 The next question presented is
whether A has a right to maintain an action for complete partition against
both B and C. We have determined that the life estate may be partitioned at
the instance of either A or B, and that the remainder may be partitioned at
the instance of either A or C, thus by the two actions we may have a partition
in kind, or by sale, of the entire estate. Why, then, should not the two actions
be combined, and complete and permanent partition be allowed at the instance
of A? Partition of all interests can be forced by A by indirection, and there
would seem to be little reason why it should all be accomplished in one action.
To require a new partition at the termination of the life estate of B involves
additional expense on the part of A, and it will also prevent A, the owner in fee
of the undivided one half, from making any permanent improvements on his
portion, since that portion may be allotted him in the second partition.
Generally the life tenant will not care whether the partition be permanent or
not and since he can in no way be injured by permanent partition the advantages
to A would seem to be of sufficient importance to tip the scales in favor of per-
manent partition. Should the land be incapable of partition in kind, and a sale
become necessary, the only loss to the remainderman is the possibility of an
increase in the value of the property between the time of the partition and the
death of the life tenant, whereas the above mentioned advantages to A are
certain and tangible. Once again the weight of convenience and necessity is in
favor of permanent partition.29
As previously stated, an action for the partition of the life estate, subject
to the remainder, can be maintained at the instance of B.80 And in the dis-
cussion of problem two we determined that B, a life tenant, could not maintain
an action of partition against C, the remainderman. 81 But should not B be
allowed to maintain an action for complete partition of the estate against both A
and C? Most states at early times declared that the life tenant could not have per-
manent partition, and such would seem to be the result in Missouri today. 2 How-
ever most courts today recognize the right of the life tenant to have partition
28. Hayes v. McReynolds, 144 Mo. 348, 46 S. W. 161 (1898); Flournoy
v. Kirkman, 270 Mo. 1, 192 S. W. 462 (1917); Crowley v. Sutton, 209 S. W.
902 (Mo. 1919); Carson v. Hecke, 282 Mo. 580, 222 S. W. 850 (1920); Dennig
v. Mispagel, 260 S. W. 72 (Mo. 1924); Virgin v. Kennedy, 326 Mo. 400, 32 S.
W. (2d) 91 (1930).
29. Atkinson v. Brady, 114 Mo. 200, 21 S. W. 480 (1893); Hamby v.
Hamby, 165 Ala. 171, 51 So. 732 (1910); Fitts v. Craddock, 144 Ala. 437, 39 So.
506 (1906); Tower v. Tower, 141 Ind. 223, 40 N. E. 747 (1894); Brevoort v.
Brevoort, 70 N. Y. 136 (1877); Morgan v. Staley, 11 Ohio 389 (1842); Tieman
v. Baker, 63 Tex. 641 (1885); Morris v. Morris, 45 Tex. Civ. App. 60, 99 S. W.
872 (1907). See Smith v. Andrew, 50 Ind. App. 602, 98 N. E. 734 (1912);
Stricker v. Mott, 2 Paige 387 (N. Y. 1831).
30. See note 27, supra.
31. See note 20, supra.
32. White v. Summerville, 283 Mo. 268, 223 S. W. 101 (1920); Stevens
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binding on the remainderman and the owner of the undivided one half in fee.33
The reasons for permitting permanent partition at the instance of A have been
pointed out, and those reasons are of equal force in an action at the instance of
the life tenant, B, since in either case the interests of A must be considered.
If the reasoning in two Missouri cases were followed, it would seem that the
court could properly order partition and sale, with one half of the proceeds
being set aside or invested for the benefit of B for his life upon his posting a
bond to guarantee the delivery of the corpus to the remainderman at B's death,
the other one half of the proceeds to be immediately given to A.34 However,
no Missouri case has applied this procedure to this situation. It would seem
a desirable result in the case of partition by means of sale since the life tenant
would lose much of the true value of his estate were he forced to sell the life
estate alone, whereas the remainderman loses only the possibility of an increase
in the value of the land between the time of partition and the death of the
life tenant. The interests of the life tenant and of the owner of the undivided
one-half in fee in complete and permanent partition would seem to overcome
any arguments against such complete partition.
At one time Missouri allowed vested remaindermen to maintain partition
against other vested remaindermen and the life tenant of the entire estate,35
though the opinion said nothing about the partition being subject to or not
affecting the right of the life tenant. This case was later overruled,36 and
today the remainderman's remedy is limited to an action to partition the re-
mainder alone.37 Many courts refuse to allow the owner of the remainder in an
undivided share to compel a partition against the interests in possession.38 Such
a result is perfectly logical when you, recall that the original purpose of the
partition statutes was to remedy the difficulties and hardships of co-ownership
in possession.
33. Sparks v. Clay, 185 Mo. 393, 84 S. W. 40 (1904), overruled by, Gibson
v. Gibson, 280 Mo. 519, 219 S. W. 561 (1920); Gayle v, Johnston, 80 Ala. 395
(1885); Letcher v. Allen, 180 Ala. 254, 60 So. 828 (1913); Hill v. Sangamon
Loan & Trust Co., 302 Ill. 33, 134 N. E. 112 (1922); Tower v. Tower, 141 Ind.
223, 40 N. E. 747 (1894); Tolson v. Bryan, 130 Md. 338. 100 Ati. 366 (1917):
Nitz v. Widman, 106 Neb. 736, 184 N. W. 172 (1921); Holmes v. Fulton, 193
Pa. 270, 44 Atl. 426 (1899).
34. Byars v. Howe, 311 Mo. 14, 276 S. W. 43 (1925); Rupp v. Molitor,
320 Mo. 938, 9 S. W. (2d) 609 (1928).
35. Preston v. Brant, 96 Mo. 552, 10 S. W. 78 (1888); followed in Doerner
v. Doerner, 161 Mo. 399, 61 S. W. 801 (1901). This decision relied upon Reinders
v. Koppelmann, 68 Mo. 482 (1878). But in this later case contingent remainders
were involved and the suit was at the instance of the life tenant. So the re-
liance would seem to have been misplaced.
36. Gibson v. Gibson, 280 Mo. 519, 219 S. W. 561 (1920).
37. See note 28, supra.
38. Simmons v. MacAdaras, 6 Mo. App. 297 (1878); Schori v. Stephens,
62 Ind. 441 (1878); Harding v. Craft, 21 App. Div. 139, 47 N. Y. Supp. 450
(1897); Merritt v. Hughes, 36 W. Va. 356, 15 S. E. 56 (1892).
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4. A has an undivided one half in fee, B has a life estate in an undivided one
half, and A has the remainder in fee in an undivided one half
A, as the owner of 'the undivided share in fee in possession, has the power
to compel partition for the duration of the life estate,30 as has been previously
pointed out. Then our question is: Should this partition in kind, or by sale, be
permanent and complete? It would seem that the answer should certainly be
"yes."40 The only other person interested is the life tenant and he can in no
way be injured by a permanent partition, since his life interest can be destroyed
regardless of whether partition is permanent or not. If the land is incapable
of partition in kind, the sale should include all of the interests in the land, since
an individual sale of each interest would necessitate taking a loss in value.4 '
B, the owner of the life estate, should have the power to compel partition
in kind or by sale. Clearly he would have this power if the owner of the un-
divided half in remainder were other than the person who also owns the un-
divided one half in fee. 42 Why, then, should it make any difference that A hap-
pens to own both of the interests? The same arguments that were advanced
urging complete partition in kind at the instance of the owner in fee would
apply to a suit at the instance of the life tenant, since in either case the interests
of A should be given consideration and weight. Certainly if the partition is by
means of sale it is to the life tenant's advantage to have complete partition, so
that he will not be forced to sell his life interest at reduced valuation.
5. A has an undivided one half for life, with the remainder as to that un-
divided one half in B. C has the other undivided one half for life, and the
remainder to that undivided one half is in D
This situation is very like the one discussed in problem two. It differs in
that here there are two or more life tenants with undivided shares instead of
but one, and there are two or more remaindermen instead of but one. Cer-
tainly the life tenants should have the right to partition in kind among them-
selves subject to the remainders, so that each may have exclusive possession
of his share for life. And the cases allow such partition.43 Such actual division
should be adequate relief for the life tenant,44 since all he is interested in is the
39. Doerner v. Doerner, 161 Mo. 399, 61 S. W. 801 (1901) ; Havey v. Kelleher,
36 App. Div. 201, 56 N. Y. Supp. 889 (1899); of. Lindley v. de la Pole, 131
Wash. 657, 230 Pac. 851 (1924).
40. Atkinson v. Brady, 114 Mo. 200, 21 S. W. 480 (1893); Clements v.
Faulk & Co., 181 Ala. 219, 61 So. 264 (1913).
41. Havey v. Kelleher, 36 App. Div. 201, 56 N. Y. Supp. 889 (1899).
42. See note 33, supra.
43. Carson v. Hecke, 282 Mo. 580, 222 S. W. 850 (1920); Gray v. Clement,
286 Mo. 100, 227 S. W. 111 (1920); Watkins v. Gilmore, 130 Ga. 797, 62 S.
E. 32 (1908); Hawkins v. McDougal, 125 Ind. 597, 25 N. E. 807 (1890); Met-
calfe v. Miller, 96 Mich. 459, 56 N. W. 16 (1893); Buckis v. Townsend, 100 N.J. Eq. 374, 136 Atl. 432 (1927); Judkins v. Judkins, 109 Mass. 181 (1872);
Eisner v. Curiel, 2 App. Div. 522, 37 N. Y. Supp. 1119 (1896). As to the ef-
fect upon the remainderman, see King v. Theis, 272 Mo. 416, 199 S. W. 183
(1917).
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exclusive possession for his life. So there exists no need for permanent par-
tition, and such has often been denied. 45 However, should the land be incapable
of partition in kind it will be seen that the life estates alone would have to be
sold at reduced prices. And it has been said that this is sufficient reason to
allow a partition by sale of all the interests, even though opposed by the owners
of the future interests. It is true that between A and C, and B and D there is
no cotenancy of the type of which we ordinarily speak. But note upon the
death of either A or C, either B or D becomes the owner of an undivided one
half in fee and thus the cotenant of the remaining life tenant (problem three).
So in a sense there is a future cotenancy, and the argument for complete par-
tition is stronger that in the case of the lone life tenant and remainderman.
6. A has an undivided one half share in fee and an undivided one half share
for life, and B has an undivided one half share in remainder
This situation is similar to that in problem three, in which A had an un-
divided one half share in fee, B had an undivided one half share for life, and
C had an undivided one half share in remainder. It will be recalled that in that
situation most states allowed A to compel partition against all parties inter-
ested. Here, unless A has the same power, he will not feel free to improve or
enjoy his undivided share in fee, since his heirs may not get the improved por-
tion.46 It is difficult to see why the fact that A also owns an undivided one
half share for life should interfere with his right to full enjoyment of the other
undivided one half share which he holds in fee. If A should sell his one half
interest for life to one X, most states would allow A to have partition against
X and B. Why then should A not be given the same right to directly partition
against B, since he can achieve the desired result by conveying his life estate
to X until after the partition? This is the view taken by a majority of the
courts.47 This result seems sound where partition in kind is sought, and even
where a sale is necessary a permanent partition seems more expedient. Yet
some courts have denied the owner of the entire possessory interest, and the-
undivided one half share in remainder, the right of partition against the owner
of the other one half share in remainder. 48 These cases apparently reason that
since A has the entire estate for life there is no cotenancy between him and B.
A has the exclusive enjoyment of the whole for his life, and B's estate succeeds
his heirs. This situation has been created in Missouri by Mo. REv. STAT. (1929)
§ 3108, changing what would have been a fee tail at common law.
45. Traversy v. Bell, 195 Iowa 1243, 196 N. W. 439 (1923); Eversole v.
Combs, 130 Ky. 82, 112 S. W. 1132 (1908); Burton v. Cahill, 192 N. C. 505,
135 S. E. 332 (1926); Ray v. Poole, 187 N. C. 749, 123 S. E. 5 (1924); see
Jenkins v. Fahey, 73 N. Y. 355, 360 (1878).
46. FRmEmAN, op. cit. supra note 3, §§ 509, 510, 511.
47. Clements v. Faulk & Co., 181 Ala. 219, 61 So. 264 (1913); Lynch v.
Leurs, 30 Ind. 411 (1868) ; Shafer v. Covey, 90 Kan. 588, 135 Pac. 676 (1913) ;
Weedon v. Power, 202 Ky. 542, 260 S. W. 385 (1924); Orsburn v. Orsburn,
196 Ky. 176, 244 S. W. 417 (1922); Lucy v. Kelly, 117 Va. 318, 84 S. E. 661
(1915).
48. Brown v. Brown, 67 W. Va. 251, 67 S. E. 596 (1910); Pabst Brewing
Co. v. Melms, 105 Wis. 441, 81 N. W. 882 (1900).
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that of A, it is not coterminous with it. Hence there can be no partition be-
tween A and B. Note that this result is reached by confusing this situation with
the one in which there is a single life tenant and a single remainderman.
Generally the remainderman is not permitted to have partition against the
life tenant and that is again true in this situation. 40 B is the potential cotenant
with A of the "remainder" and under the Missouri statute remaindermen may
partition their future interest subject to the life estate.50 Therefore, Missouri
logically should allow B to force partition of the "remainder," subject to the life
estate, in this situation. The reason for the failure of some courts to do so
may lie in the fact that the courts fail to recognize that A's interests could be
also described as a life estate in the whole and a remainder in an undivided one
half, rather than as an undivided one half in fee and an undivided one half for
life.
7. Any of the foregoing types with additional contingent remainders or
executory interests
In all prior discussion the word "remainder" has been used as referring to
vested future interests. The next problem is to determine whether partition in
kind, or by means of sale, is a matter of right when there are contingent re-
mainders or executory interests involved. Missouri has three statutes which,
when read in conjunction, indicate that contingent remainders or executory in-
terests should be no bar to partition.5' The decisions in Missouri seem to be in
utter confusion on these questions, 52 and apparently "the last word has not been
spoken concerning the partition" of contingent future interests.5 3 Professor
Hudson disapproved of the extension of the Missouri statutes to include them.
Let us first consider the case in which the owner of a possessory interest
institutes partition, and the estates include contingent remainders or executory
interests. One of the most simple cases is that in which A and B own the de-
feasible fee as cotenants, with executory interests in X and Y, or in persons not
yet in existence. A or B may have partition in kind subject to the executory
interests; or they may force a sale with the executory interests being transferred
from the land to the proceeds of the sale.54
The next case to consider is the one in which A owns an undivided one-fourth
in fee and the other three-fourths of the life estate, with contingent remainders,
after the life estate, in B, C and D. It would seem that partition should be
49. Schori v. Stephens, 62 Ind. 441 (1878); Wood v. Sugg, 91 N. C. 93
(1884) ; McCommas v. Curtis, 62 Tex. Civ. App. 227, 130 S. W. 594 (1910).
50. See note 28, supra.
51. Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) §§ 1545, 1547, 1551.
52. Hudson, The Transfer and Partition of Remainders in Missouri (1917)
14 U. op Mo. BuuL. L. SER. 3, 23; Nelson, Partition Where Life Estates and
Remainders Are Involved (1931) 42 U. oF Mo. BULL. L. SER. 5, 9.
53. Hudson, op cit. supra note 52, at 29.
54. Buckner v. Buckner, 210 S. W. 887 (Mo. 1919). The concurring jus-
tices indicate that the contingent interests will be transferred to the proceeds,
and that the trial court should in some way preserve the proceeds in order to
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allowed here, and such was in effect done in the case of Sparks v. Clay.5 5 Sike-
meier v. Galvin56 declared that a life tenant and one contingent remainderman
could compel partition against the other remaindermen. But that case is weak-
ened, and may be distinguished, by the fact that the will creating the interests
provided for sale of the land "by a concurrence in the deed, as parties, of the
ostensible heirs," and the fact that all of the "ostensible heirs" were parties
to the suit. Stockwell v. Stockwel 57 and Hill v. Hill58 disapproved of Reinders
v. Koppelmann, Sparks v. Clay and Sikemeier v. Galvin, and Gibson v. Gibson59
expressly overruled them insofar as they were in conflict with Hill v. Hill.60 But
since Hill v. Hill was based on violation of the expressed intention of the testa-
tor, just what was overruled is not clear. But it is evident that the court in-
tended to state that an owner in fee of an undivided share, or a life tenant,
should not have the power to compel partition against a contingent remainder-
man.68 It is submitted that the owner in fee of the undivided share should be
able to compel partition in kind, or by means of sale, against a life tenant and
the contingent remaindermen. He could do so were the remainders vested,62
then why should he be prevented from so doing simply because the remainders
are contingent? The statute providing for sale against contingent remainder-
men and executory devisees at the instance of the possessory owner, when the
"life or other estate" of immediate enjoyment is burdensome or unprofitable,63
indicates that remedies involving the sale of contingent remainders and execu-
tory interests are not contrary to the policy of our state if the contingent inter-
ests in the proceeds from the sale are protected in some manner by the court.6 4
So it seems that the court would not be violating either the letter or the spirit of
the general partition statute were it to force partition of contingent remainders
at the instance of the owner of an undivided share in fee..
55. 185 Mo. 393, 84 S. W. 40 (1904). In Reinders v. Koppelmann, the
plaintiff had a life estate, and was also owner of a share in remainder; the
other remainders were contingent. Partition was allowed, and the court held
that contingent interests were no bar to partition. The court failed to note the
possibility of merger of the plaintiff's interests, although there may be merger
in such a case.
56. 124 Mo. 367, 27 S. W. 551 (1894).
57. 262 Mo. 671, 172 S. W. 23 (1914). Here A, the life tenant, and one
of the contingent remaindermen asked for partition against the other contingent
remaindermen. The persons holding the reversion, which existed until the con-
tingent remainders vested, were not joined, so the case might have been decided
on that point. However the court states that contingent remainders could not be
partitioned.
58. 261 Mo. 55, 168 S. W. 1165 (1914). Here the facts were the same as
in the Stockwell case, see note 57, supra, and the primary reason for the de-
cision here was that the partition would be in violation of the testators expressed
intention. And once again the statement that contingent remainders cannot
be partitioned was more or less gratuitous.
59. 280 Mo. 519, 219 S. W. 561 (1920).
60. 261 Mo. 55, 168 S. W. 1165 (1914).
61. Except in the situation described in Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § 1546.
62. Atkinson v. Brady, 114 Mo. 200, 21 S. W. 480 (1893). See note
29, supra.
63. Mo. Rpy. STAT. (1929) § 1546.
64. Byars v. Howe, 311 Mo. 14, 276 S. W. 43 (1925); concurring opinion
in Buckner v. Buckner, 210 S. W. 887 (Mo. 1919).
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Some states have statutes65 whose terms are specifically broad enough to
allow the owner of a freehold interest to enforce partition against owners of
contingent remainders,66 and shifting or springing executory interests.6 7
If B has a vested remainder can he maintain a suit for partition against
C and D, contingent remaindermen, subject to the life estate? Clearly B could
do so were C and D vested remaindermen, 68 and it is but a step further to
allow him to enforce division, or sale, of contingent remainders. The Missouri
statutes of partition are broad enough to include such partition, and, as previ-
ously stated, partition of contingent remainders is not contrary to the policy
of Missouri. It may be argued that there should be no partition among the
future interests, subject to the life estate, even as to vested remaindermen.69 But
if it is conceded that remaindermen should be allowed to partition vested future
interests at the instance of a vested remainderman, then it is submitted that
contingent remainders should be subject to the same power.
The contingent remainderman, or executory devisee, has no such interest
as will support an action for partition by him against any of the interested
parties.70 He may never be "entitled to possession, and he should not be per-
mitted to waste the time of the court, cause the other parties trouble, expense
and possible injury, when he might receive nothing by way of compensation were
he able to maintain partition. The interests are clearly in favor of refusing
him the right to maintain an action for either division or sale.
JAMES H. OTTMAN
65. D. C. CoDE (1929) tit. 25, § 424. "Wherever one or more persons shall
be entitled to an estate for life or years, or a base or qualified fee simple, or
any other limited or conditional 'estate in lands, and any other person . . .
shall be entitled to a remainder . . . vested or contingent, or an interest by
way of executory devise . . . on application of any of the parties in interest
the court may . . . decree a sale . . . of the property." See also the
English Real Property Act of 1925 (15 Geo. V, e. 20).
66. McClure v. Crume, 141 Ky. 361, 132 S. W. 433 (1910); Sohier v.
Mass. General Hospital, 3 Cush. 483 (Mass. 1849); Dawson v. Wood, 177
N. C. 158, 98 S. E. 459 (1919); Matter of Field, 131 N. Y. 184, 30 N. E. 48(1892); Geary v. Butts, 84 W. Va. 348, 99 S. E. 492 (1919); Lueft v. Lueft,
129 Wis. 534, 109 N. W. 652 (1906).
67. Denson v. Denson, 125 Md. 357, 93 Atl. 981 (1915); In re Vail, 99 N.
J. Eq. 598, 133 Atl. 866 (1926); Ebling v. Dreyer, 149 N. Y. 460, 44 N. E.
155 (1896); Clark v. Clark, 110 Ohio St. 644, 144 N. E. 743 (1924); Burlingham
v. Vandevender, 47 W. Va. 804, 35 S. E. 835 (1900).
68. See note 28, supra.
69. Duke v. Allen, 198 Ky. 368, 248 S. W. 894 (1923).
70. Stockwell v. Stockwell, 262 Mo. 671, 172 S. W. 23 (1914); Ruddell v.
Wren, 208 Ill. 508, 70 N. E. 751 (1904); Heininger v. Meissmer, 261 Ill. 105,
103 N. E. 565 (1913) ; Vinson v. Wise, 159 N. C. 653, 75 S. E. 732 (1912) ; Green




Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1941
